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abstract
A Modelist Proposal
by
Jian Shen

Adviser: Professor David Papineau

Many philosophers of mind regard What is representation? as a question of paramount
importance. In ask this question they overlook the possibility—what I argue is in fact
the correct answer—that there is simply nothing specifically representational about
representational systems. “Representation” is a label we somehow feel compelled
to stick to some systems but not to others, but it fails to pick out an explanatorily
relevant kind. This is most clearly seen when we look at representational systems
through the lens of formal models—in particular, the sender–receiver model as
developed by David Lewis, Brian Skyrms, and others. I offer a cosmetically different
but mathematically equivalent formulation of the model, which makes it easy to show
that the same model may be satisfied by intuitively representational and intuitively
non-representational systems alike. Since the model is already explanatorily complete
(at an appropriately abstract level), barring other arguments to the contrary—some
of which I try to refute—representations are explanatorily irrelevant.
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Introduction
Were wordy titles still in fashion, this work could have been titled, with apologies to
Jonathan Swift, “A Modelist Proposal for Preventing Representation from Being a
Burthen to Philosophers”. My approach is modelist, in that I try to explain linguistic
and mental representation using formal models. In this I am following the lead
of David Lewis, Brian Skyrms, and many others, and I will be using the kind of
model they developed: the sender–receiver model.1 And my work is essentially a
proposal. While I do argue for a certain way—the modelist way—of understanding
representations, my arguments are best taken in a tentative spirit. Most modelist
work has only begun in recent years. The pudding looks promising enough (to me
at least), but there is no doubt that much of the eating has yet to be done. A little
modesty is appropriate.
As for preventing representation from being a burden to philosophers, what I mean
is this. Many philosophers of mind regard What is representation? as a question
1 Aside

from Lewis’s seminal 1969 book, some of the exemplars of this approach are the works of
Skyrms and associates: Skyrms (1996, 2010), Huttegger (2007a), Zollman et al. (2013), Alexander
(2014), and O’Connor (2014). On the less technical, more philosophical side: Godfrey-Smith (2013,
2014), Birch (2014), Shea et al. (2017), and Fallis and Lewis (forthcoming), to name a few. I also wish
to credit some works which, while not concerned with representation as such and thus not discussed
in what follows, are modelist in spirit and have greatly influenced my thinking: Braitenberg (1984),
Gärdenfors (2000), Skyrms (2003), Gallistel and King (2009), and Gärdenfors (2014).

1

of paramount importance. Naturally they expect modelists, who claim to study
representation, to give an explicit answer. But they would be disappointed. A modelist
may be found pronouncing on what representational systems are (they are sender–
receiver systems, i.e., systems describable by sender–receiver models), and he has
much to say about what these systems are like, what they do, and how they evolve.
But none of these, of course, answers the Paramount Question head-on: not what
representational systems are like or how they evolve, but what representation is, what
is specifically representational about a representational system. Indeed, modelists
may seem to be deliberately evading the Paramount Question. Lewis would not say
how the meaning of a particular signal is fixed: “I have now described the character
of a case of signaling without mentioning the meaning of the signals … But nothing
important seems to have been left unsaid, so what has been said must somehow
imply that the signals have their meanings” (Lewis 1969, pp. 124–25). Huttegger
declares that “a basic function of language is to facilitate coordinated behavior” and
“[m]eaning is thus a consequence of pragmatic factors, [that is, it] emerges from
the interactions of less than fully rational agents” (Huttegger 2007a, p. 2). “Well,
an account of how representation emerges is nice,” I can hear some philosophers
complain, “but it does not tell me what representation is, or, put another way, how
representation differs from other, non-representational ways of coordinating behavior
(such as the convention, in some cities, of standing on the right side of an escalator).”
Are modelists any the worse for not giving a straight answer? I don’t think so.
I think the Paramount Question itself is misguided. People who ask the question
overlook the possibility—and what I shall argue is the correct answer—that there is
simply nothing specifically representational about representational systems. “Rep2

resentation” is a label we somehow feel compelled to stick to some sender–receiver
systems but not to others, for no good theoretical reason. The label does not pick
out an explanatorily relevant kind, in other words. Dividing things in the real world
into representational and non-representational systems is thus a bit like dividing
the sky into constellations. It may come to us naturally, it may have a venerable
tradition, it may even be practically convenient, but it does not explain anything, and
there isn’t and cannot be a theory of, say, Orion. Lewis would have been right in the
quote above if he meant (as I think he did mean) that nothing of explanatory value
would be lost if we omit to say what representation is. Assuming that representation
has a respectable explanatory role and thus we need to make sense of it is why the
Paramount Question seems so important and yet so hard. I reject that assumption. If
I’m right, philosophers of mind should feel relieved, for they will have one less hard
question to worry about.

A usual way to begin an inquiry into the nature of representation is by enumerating
some things that presumably are representations and some things that presumably
aren’t (one then goes on to ask whether members of the first group share a common
nature). And in doing so one typically consults one’s inner “folk” voice, for, unlike
the idea of genes or that of imaginary numbers, the idea of representation has a folk
origin. Ordinary people had occupied this conceptual ground and built up their folk
ways of using representational language long before any philosopher came along.
Philosophers are allowed to make small alternations here and there, but if they go too
far their theory is in danger of ceasing to be about what it is supposed to be about: if
a theory ascribes “beliefs” to rocks, it is probably not a theory of belief anymore.
3

This is not how I will proceed. It would make sense to begin by noting examples
of each kind—representational and non-representational systems—if there is some
explanatorily important difference between them, but I do not believe such difference
exists. There is not much point in drawing a distinction that will turn out to be
explanatorily irrelevant.
There is another way. I shall begin with a central case of a representational
system, one such that, wherever the line (or gray zone) one may like to draw between
representational and non-representational systems, it will fall comfortably on the
representational side. Following Lewis (1969), I choose Paul Revere’s lantern system
(“one if by land, two if by sea”, etc.). The next step is to strip this system down to
the essentials—to the elements in virtue of which the folk consider it a paradigmatic
representational system. What we will find, I think, is essentially what Lewis found:
a sender–receiver model, a mathematical construct happily free of representational
idioms. This model, moreover, is explanatorily complete. As with any explanatory
model, some initial parameters need to be taken for granted, but once that is done
the model will leave nothing about the system’s working unexplained (on an abstract
level, that is; every explanatory model operates at a certain level of abstraction).
At this point, some may see the modelist approach as pointing the way to a
naturalistic reduction of representation—a holy grail that has eluded philosophers
for years. Although it is not immediately clear how sender–receiver models may
be applied to anything more sophisticated than “one if by land”, there is also no
immediate reason to be pessimistic (Chapter 2 will address one important worry).
Perhaps one can try working in that general direction and hope for the best.
I will take the argument in a different direction, however. Yes, the lantern system
4

can be reduced to a sender–receiver model, but so can systems that are borderline
or even clearly not representational. Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 1, there are
systems that are not representational by any folk standard however stretched, but are,
for all explanatory purposes, equivalent to the lantern system. As a further argument,
in Chapter 3 I will discuss several cases of deception among non-human animals.
Those cases form what we might call an explanatory continuum—the same kind of
explanation applies to them all, differing only in parameters that exhibit continuous
variation—and the continuum spans from clearly representational systems on the
one end to hardly representational systems on the other. The upshot of all these
considerations is that representation is not the right target for reduction. It is too
small, too provincial. A reduction of representation is, at best, about as good as the
reduction of water in the Hudson River to H2 O: not false, but aimed at a wrong
target.
It is worth noting that my argument does not rely on any claim about explanations
at a lower level excluding or preempting or rendering irrelevant explanations at a
higher level. Representation does not matter explanatorily, not because it can be
reduced to something at a lower level which then steals all the explanatory credit, but
because representation and some forms of non-representation can both be reduced to
essentially the same thing at a (slightly) lower level. To use the water analogy again,
being a representational system is like being water in the Hudson River. Being water
in the Hudson river is not what explains why it can dissolve salt, not because all the
explanatory credit goes to H2 O molecules (though that might be the case, too), but
because water elsewhere is also H2 O and can also dissolve salt.

5

Here is the plan for each chapter. Chapter 1 sets out the basics of simple sender–
receiver models. It seems to me that the usual, mostly informal way of talking about
these models may be obscuring what they really are or, more to the point, what they
need not be. They are dynamic Bayesian networks—austere models with minimal
ontological commitments—and they do not have to be anything more. So I will
present them as such. Then I will show that these models may be satisfied by systems
that are non-representational by the folk standard and require no explanation in
representational terms.
Chapter 2 shows how sender–receiver models may generate something a little
more sophisticated than “one if by land, two if by sea”: in particular, how it may
generate signals (or representations if you like) that are either purely indicative or
purely imperative. This might seem to be something of a digression from the main
argument, and might even seem contrary to my central thesis that representation
does not matter. Not so: the main argument—that representational systems are too
provincial a target for reduction because there are more sender–receiver systems than
representational systems—would not work unless every representational system is
reducible to some sender–receiver system, and this is not a given. It is not clear, in
particular, how a reduction would work for purely indicative and purely imperative
representations. Chapter 2 answers this challenge.
Chapter 3 returns to the main line of argument. While Chapter 2 is mainly
meant to reassure the skeptics of sender–receiver models, this chapter is directed
at the sympathizers who nonetheless would like to see the explanatory value of
representation vindicated and who remain unconvinced by the argument in Chapter 1.
Here, as a further argument, I consider several cases of deceptive signaling between
6

non-human animals, some of which naturally prompt descriptions in representational
terms, others not, and I show that (at an appropriate level of abstraction) there is no
important difference in how those cases should be explained. One may decree that all
those cases be considered as involving representation in some technical sense, but
that would come a little too close to ascribing “beliefs” to rocks. On the other hand, if
we simply give up representation as an explanatorily relevant kind and stop worrying
about what a deceptive signal “means” (or, indeed, whether it is capable of meaning
anything at all), nothing of explanatory value will be lost.
Is it really true that nothing of explanatory value will be lost? In the fourth
and final chapter I consider a miscellaneous set of claims for taking representation
seriously. Here it suffices to say that I do not find them convincing.

7

1
Simple Sender–Receiver Models
The arrangement between Paul Revere and the sexton of the Old North Church—
“one if by land, two if by sea”—seems to be as clear an example of a representational
system as one can find. This is not to say that hanging lanterns is all there is to human
communication; it clearly isn’t. Yet, crude as the lantern system is, it feels natural to
say that one lantern in the belfry “means” or “represents” that the British troops are
coming by land. If we take this folk intuition for granted, what are the features in
virtue of which the lantern system is representational?
I think Lewis (1969) has the right answer—or rather, he has all the right pieces,
but he puts them together in a way that isn’t quite suited to my purpose.1 Adapted
for my purpose, the lantern system has the following features:
(1)

The system involves a sender and a receiver (which Lewis calls “communicator”
and “audience”). The world may be in one of several states: the British may be
coming by land, or coming by sea. The sender can observe the state and send
signals (one or two lanterns), but otherwise cannot do anything consequential.

1 Lewis’s purpose is to make sense of truth by convention.
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The receiver has the power to act with direct consequences—to ride and spread
the alarm—but cannot directly observe the state. There is a coordination
problem to solve.
(2)

The sender and receiver solve the coordination problem by adopting informative strategies. A strategy is a mapping from one variable to another. A sender
strategy maps states to signals. A receiver strategy maps signals to acts. By an
informative strategy, I mean a strategy that results in high mutual information between the two variables it relates. “One if by land, two if by sea” is a
highly informative strategy; “Two lanterns no matter what” would be a rather
uninformative strategy.

(3)

The sender and receiver adopt informative strategies as a result of a stabilizing
force. “Force” is metaphorical; its exact nature will vary from case to case. In
the case of Revere and the sexton, it was the fact that they shared a common
purpose and were capable of rational thinking: they foresaw what they needed
to do to achieve the common goal, and did it. For less sophisticated senders
and receivers, the force may be some kind of reinforcement learning, or it could
be natural selection.

I will call any formal model with the above features a simple sender–receiver model.
Figure 1.1 is a schematic diagram of such a model.
The simple sender–receiver model seems to have left out nothing that might
contribute to the lantern system’s representational credential. At any rate, the model
leaves out nothing that is explanatorily relevant: the model completely explains (at its
own level of abstraction) why Revere and the sexton behave as they do.
9

state

Sender

Receiver

act

outcome

signal

Figure 1.1. A simple sender–receiver model. The solid arrows indicate causal
connections. The dashed arrows represent the stabilizing force.

Now since the lantern system is a representational system—a paradigmatic one,
even—perhaps any system that satisfies the same model, and thus can be explained in
the same fashion as the lantern system, would be representational? Surprisingly, that’s
not the case. There are systems that satisfy the same simple model but do not look
like representational systems at all. This raises the question of whether representation
has any explanatory relevance—and suggests a negative answer. I will discuss this in
section 1.3.
The next two sections will do some preparatory work. I will present sender–
receiver models in a different way from how they are usually presented,2 as dynamic
Bayesian networks. This will make my later job easier.
2 For a conventional presentation, see Huttegger (2007a), quoted on page 20.
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1.1 Sender–Receiver Models as Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Some definitions first. A graph is a set of nodes connected by a set of edges. A Bayesian
network (without “dynamic”) is a directed acyclic graph where every node represents
a variable, the edges represent (typically causal) influences between variables, and
the variables all possess something called the local Markov property. Figure 1.2 is a
textbook example. That network contains four nodes, representing four variables: the
weather (it may be raining or not raining); the state of a sprinkler (it may be on or off);
the wetness of the ground; and the slipperiness of the ground. An arrowhead at the
end of an edge represents the direction of influences (in this case, causal influences):
thus rain causes the ground to be wet, but not the other way round. In a Bayesian
network every edge has an arrowhead; thus the whole graph is said to be directed. It
is also acyclic, meaning that the arrows never form a closed loop.
A Bayesian network is often annotated, as Figure 1.2 is, with tables that specify
how the values of the variable probabilistically depend on each other. The tables in
Figure 1.2 depict the familiar situation that the ground is likely to be wet when it rains
or when the sprinkler is on, and wet ground is likely to be slippery.
A directed acyclic graph does not yet a Bayesian network make. The variables
represented by the nodes also need to satisfy the local Markov property, defined
as follows. If variable A directly influences variable B—if there is an edge with an
arrowhead pointing from A to B—then we say that A is a parent of B, and B a child
of A. A variable’s ancestors include its parents and, recursively, all the ancestors
of its parents. A variable’s descendants include its children and, recursively, all the
descendants of its children. (Thus wet is a child and descendant of rain, a child and
11

rain

no rain

.3

.7

on

off

.22

.78

rain
sprinkler

rain, sprinkler on
no rain, sprinkler on
rain, sprinkler off
no rain, sprinkler off

wet

dry

.99
.9
.92
.1

.01
.1
.08
.9

wet

slippery

wet
not wet

slippery

not slippery

.84
.2

.16
.8

Figure 1.2

descendant of sprinkler, and the sole parent of slippery. slippery is a descendant,
but not a child, of rain and of sprinkler.) A variable has the local Markov property
if knowing the values of its parents (if it has any parents) renders it independent of
all of its non-descendants. rain and sprinkler have this property trivially, since
neither has parents. wet also has it in a trivial way: the set of its parents coincides
with the set of its non-descendants, so it is trivially true that knowing the values of
its parents renders it independent of its non-descendants. slippery is a bit more
interesting. It has three non-descendants, two of which (rain and sprinkler) are
12

not its parents. So for slippery to have the local Markov property, it needs to be the
case that knowing that the ground is wet (or not) is sufficient for determining the
probability that it is slippery, and any further information about the weather or the
sprinkler will no longer matter.
The local Markov property is the network’s way of saying that an immediate
influence “screens off ” a variable from indirect influences: thus Figure 1.2 says that
the ground’s wetness determines its slipperiness regardless of weather. (Incidentally,
the local Markov property also greatly simplifies annotations. slippery has three
ancestors, each of which may be in one of two states. Normally there would be eight
distinct conditions to conditionalize on. Thanks to the local Markov property, it is
enough to conditionalize just on slippery’s parent, cutting the number down to two.)
A plain (i.e., non-dynamic) Bayesian network is already a partial description of
a simple sender–receiver model. It captures what I call a snapshot, or the state of a
model at a particular moment. Figure 1.3 is a snapshot of the lantern system once
“one if by land, two if by sea” has been agreed upon. The network says the following:
the deployment of the British troops, S, is an independent variable (independent in
the sense of not influenced by any other variable in the network; it does not mean
probabilistic independence); upon S depends M (for “message”), the number of
lanterns hung in the belfry, as described by the table associated with M; Revere’s
action, A, depends on M, as described by the table associated with A; A is screened
off from S by M, which corresponds to the model’s assumption that Revere can
see the signal but not what the British are doing; there are no other influences or
dependencies, direct or indirect.3
3 While

we are at it, Figure 1.4 shows the snapshots of another two models investigated by Skyrms
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M

S

by land

by sea

.5

.5

A

one

two

1
0

0
1

by land
by sea

one
two

A1

A2

1
0

0
1

Figure 1.3. A snapshot of a simple sender–receiver model. A1 : get prepared
for a land invasion; A2 : get prepared for a naval invasion.

A snapshot cannot capture change, or anything that only manifests itself through
change, such as the effect of a stabilizing force. To give a complete description of an
evolving system, we need a way to specify how a snapshot at one moment will evolve
into another snapshot at a later moment. What we need is a function defined over
plain Bayesian networks: a function of the form f : B → B, where B is a set of plain
Bayesian networks; or, as the case may be, f : B × C1 × C2 × · · · → B × D1 × D2 × · · · ,
where the Cs and Ds are extra parameters. I will call such a function an update
function. A dynamic Bayesian network is a plain Bayesian network augmented by an
update function.
The task of defining an appropriate update function for a given dynamics is rather
trivial if somewhat tedious. The general strategy is to annotate the networks with as
much information as we need. The following is a demonstration of how to do this,
using a more dynamic variation of the lantern system. The historical lantern system
was hardly dynamic; it was simply agreed upon and acted out once only. But suppose
that the British troops attack repeatedly. And imagine that, instead of agreeing on a
contingency plan once and for all, Revere and the sexton have to learn to coordinate
(2010).
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M1

S

M2

···

A

A1
M1
A2
S

M2
A3
M3
A4

Figure 1.4. Snapshots of two slightly less simple models. Top: a receiver
signals to another receiver, who signals to a third, who …. Information
travels along the chain but influences are screened off at each node. Bottom:
three senders each broadcast to four receivers, giving rise to a network that
is truly net-like. Annotations have been omitted.

by trial and error. Specifically, suppose they learn by reinforcement as follows. The
sexton behaves as if he has two urns labeled “by land” and “by sea”, and each urn
contains some balls, half of which are labeled “one” and the other half “two”. Revere
has two urns of his own, labeled “one” and “two”, and each urn contains some balls,
half of which are labeled “by land” and the other half “by sea”. In each round of the
game the British will be coming either by land or by sea. The sexton sees which it is,
draws a ball from the corresponding urn, notes the label on the ball (“one” or “two”),
hangs up that number of lanterns, and replaces the ball. Revere does his part in a
similar fashion (if he sees one lantern, he draws from the urn labeled “one”, and if he
draws a ball labeled “by land”, he rides out to warn his men of an attack by land—and
15
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Figure 1.5. Learning by reinforcement. The system, initially in a state described by the network at the top, gradually evolves into the state described
by the network at the bottom.

replaces the ball). If Revere ends up doing the wrong thing, the game proceeds to the
next round without further ado. If Revere does the right thing, then the sexton places
an additional ball with the same label as he just drew into the urn he just drew from,
and Revere does the same to his urns. With this process the sender and receiver will
achieve optimal coordination with a probability approaching 1 as the game goes on
(Figure 1.5).
To define an update function for this dynamics, it would be convenient to use
some non-standard annotations. Instead of filling up the tables with conditional
probabilities—.72 and so on, which is the standard way, but not a theoretical or
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practical necessity by any means—we will fill up the tables with the numbers of balls
of each kind in each of the urns, as in Figure 1.6. No descriptive power will be lost.
In fact, this annotation is more informative than the standard one: the standard
annotation is derivable from this one, but not the other way round.
Now the update function will take the following arguments: (1) a Bayesian network, with this richer annotation; and (2) five additional parameters that report on
what happened in the last round of the game: the label on the ball that the sexton
drew in the last round (bs = “one” or “two”); the urn from which the sexton drew (us =
“by land” or “by sea”); the label on the ball that Revere drew in the last round (br =
“by land” or “by sea”); the urn from which Revere drew (ur = “one” or “two”); and a
boolean value representing whether Revere’s action in the last round was a success. If
not, the function returns the input Bayesian network unchanged. If it was a success,
the function returns a new Bayesian network with the following two numbers each
incremented by 1: the number in row us , column bs , of the table associated with M,
and the number in row ur , column br , of the table associated with A.

M

S

by land

by sea

1

1

by land
by sea

A

one

two

144
57

56
243

one
two

A1

A2

150
64

48
238

Figure 1.6. Alternative annotation, convenient for the urn learning dynamics.

Evolution by natural selection follows a different sort of dynamics, but is equally
amenable to a network treatment. In fact, at the level of abstraction characteristic of
game-theoretic models, evolution is no more different from learning than different
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forms of learning are different from each other. Learning occurs when the frequencies
of strategies change in an individual, and evolution occurs when the frequencies of
strategies change in a population, but the mathematics for describing these changes
does not really differentiate between individual and populations. For all a terminological purist might protest, learning may be treated as evolution of strategies in
an imaginary population. The urn learning discussed above, for example, may be
treated as differential reproduction of balls in urns, where some balls employ the
strategy of bearing the label “one” and other balls employ the competing strategy of
bearing the label “two” (not very interesting strategies, but none the worse for that).
Likewise, evolution may be treated as learning by an imaginary individual that is the
population: as “phylogenetic learning”, as Wiener (1961) calls it.
For example, suppose the senders and the receivers are two infinite, segregated
populations (no individual is both a sender and a receiver). Suppose in each generation a sender randomly meets a receiver. They reproduce more or less successfully
according to how well they coordinate, and their offspring inherit their strategies—
usually, but not always. I choose this set of assumptions just for the sake of concreteness. What I say will apply, with minor modifications, to integrated populations,
correlated interaction, and continuous-time dynamics. Now suppose s is a sender
strategy with a frequency of ps and a fitness value of fs (given current receivers’
strategies). Let ¯f be the senders’ average fitness. Then the frequency of s in the next
generation of senders is given by the discrete-time replicator dynamics,

p0s



=

fs
¯f
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ps .

Despite the word “replicator”, the equation is not saying anything specifically about
genuine replicators. All it describes is how one frequency changes depending on other
frequencies. These frequencies might for all the equation cares be frequencies in a
population of balls in an urn, provided the balls are added and removed in appropriate
numbers. If Revere and the sexton had learned to coordinate by simulating the
discrete-time replicator dynamics with an infinite number of balls, then this equation
would have been a perfectly accurate description of their learning process.
Since from a formal model’s point of view evolution is just another kind of learning, the network in Figure 1.3 can conveniently double as a snapshot of a simple
evolutionary model. We only need to reinterpret it by replacing all references to
individuals with references to populations: probabilities of a signal chosen by the
sexton become probabilities of a signal chosen by a sender population, and so on.
Add to this network an update function (an exercise we have practiced above), and it
becomes a full-fledged evolutionary model.

1.2 Ontological Comments
Figure 1.1 might have given the impression that the sender and receiver must be things
that we can reasonably draw boxes around. It is now generally accepted that they do
not have to be smart agents, but one may think that they still have to be agents of
some sort—at least they have to be entities with some intuitively clear, non-arbitrary
boundaries (many clouds are well-defined entities by this low standard). Surely they
cannot be anything more nebulous?
Formal definitions say otherwise. For example, Huttegger (2007a, p. 4) defines
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the model I informally described at the beginning (which he calls “simple signaling
game”) as follows:
A simple signaling game Σn based on Πn [a state-to-act coordination
problem like the one faced by Revere and the sexton] is a triplet hI, {Si }i∈I ,
{ui }i∈I i, where
1.

I = {1, 2} is a set of two players, the sender, 1, and the receiver, 2;

2.

Si , i = 1, 2 is the set of strategies generated from Πn as follows:
S1 = {sk | sk : S → M} is the set of sender strategies and S2 =
{al | al : M → A} is the set of receiver strategies; and

3.

the player’s utility functions are the same and are generated by Πn
as follows: u : S × R → R and
u(sk , rl ) =

n
X

P(σj ) · u∗ (σj , (rl ◦ sk )(σj )),

j=1

where ◦ denotes the operation of function composition.
Two players are introduced in the first clause, but on closer inspection they are not
turning any mathematical wheels. The real work is done by the second and the third
clauses. The second clause introduces two set of strategies: a mapping from states
to signals, and a mapping from signals to acts. The third clause defines the utility
functions—effectively a definition of a stabilizing force. All that the “players” do
in this definition is being subscripts, as the “1” and “2” in “S1 ” and “S2 ”—arbitrary
indices for distinguishing one set of strategies from another. There is no reason why
these subscripts must refer to agents or bounded entities.
The same can be seen (literally) by looking at a simple sender–receiver model
reformulated as a network. Figure 1.3, for example, lines up three variables, like
three stools, and the sender and receiver have fallen between them into nothingness.
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Of course, the model is still committed to the existence of something, whatever it
may be, that implements the dependencies between the variables, something for the
stabilizing force in the guise of an update function to act on. It is still appropriate (if
occasionally misleading) to use “sender” to refer to whatever it is that implements the
dependency of the signal on the state, and “receiver” for whatever it is that implements
the dependency of the act on the signal. But there is no a priori requirement that these
implementers be well-defined entities. Indeed, as we will see, they do not even have
to be entities. They might even be distances between objects. In the next section I will
discuss two systems that satisfy the simple sender–receiver model but which neither
appear to the folk’s eye to involve representation nor lend themselves to explanation
in representational terms. Their main purpose is to undermine the assumption
that representation is explanatorily relevant, but they will also demonstrate how
un-entity-like senders and receivers could be.

1.3 Para-representational Systems
Consider the Watt governor (Figure 1.7), used for automatic control of steam engines.4
For an automated control device it is remarkably simple: just two massive balls,
connected by two arms to an engine’s output shaft (the rod labeled “w” in the drawing),
and connected by a bit more machinery to the engine’s throttle valve (the part labeled
“d”). When the engine is doing work, the output shaft will be rotating and swinging
the balls around like a hammer thrower swings his hammer. As the engine’s output
increases, the output shaft will rotate faster, and the balls will be swung higher. When
4 I thank David Papineau for extremely helpful discussion about this case.
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the output increases beyond a certain point, the balls will be swung high enough to
pull on the machinery attached to the throttle valve, reducing the valve’s aperture.
This will reduce the inflow of steam into the engine, the engine will output less, the
output shaft will slow down, and the balls will begin to fall. If they fall below a certain
point, the throttle valve’s aperture will be enlarged, and the balls will rise again. (A
clever engineer can keep the fluctuation to a minimum, but some fluctuation there
always will be.)

Figure 1.7. A Watt governor. This image, taken from the 4th edition of Meyers
Konversations-Lexikon (1885), is in the public domain.

Does the Watt governor look like a representational system? Does any part
of the governor—the positions of the balls, perhaps—represent the output level of
the engine? Perhaps they do to an engineer. But the question is whether there is
representation within the system; the engineer is an outsider. My inner folk voice
(and probably yours as well) says there is no representation within.
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But the system does satisfy a simple sender–receiver model—as well as any realworld system could. The relevant state is the output level of the engine; it may be
too high, too low, or (rarely) just right. The vertical position of the balls (same for
both of them) is the signal. Other things can be signals too—for example, the angle
between the two arms—but ignore them for now. There are three acts: the aperture
of the throttle valve being enlarged, being reduced, or staying the same. The three
variables have the right sort of dependencies among them, too, at least if we idealize
somewhat. The signal is clearly influenced by the state, and the act clearly by the
signal. The signal clearly screens off the act from the state. What might not be so
clear is whether the state is causally independent—isn’t the engine’s output influenced
by changes to the valve’s aperture? Well yes, but “independent” in the sense relevant
to the model is only relative to the period of time before any feedback kicks in. The
fact that the engine’s output will decrease after the valve’s aperture is reduced does
not negate the independence of the previous output level from that movement of
the aperture, any more than the British troops’ initial deployment would cease to
be independent from Revere’s action if they decided to go home upon learning that
Revere’s men had already been warned.
A plain network like the one in Figure 1.3, then, would be an accurate enough
snapshot of the Watt governor at any given moment, given appropriate adjustment
to the tables. Now we just need some dynamics to explain how the snapshot gets
here. Here our options are many and various, and some fictional history will not hurt.
For example, imagine Watt governors are optimized in an evolutionary way. The
engineers (who are not quite sane) begin with several different designs, some with
heavier balls and some with lighter ones, some with low-threshold apertures (which
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begin to close when the balls are lift up only a little) and some with high-threshold
ones (which only begin to close when the balls are lift further up). I choose to focus
on these two degrees of freedom for a reason. The weight of the balls determines
which signal will be sent (i.e., how high up the balls will be lift) given a certain output
level of the engine. It does the work of the sender—except it does not look quite like
your usual sender. The threshold of the aperture determines which action will be
taken (to reduce or to enlarge the aperture) given a certain signal (a vertical position
of the balls). It does the work of the receiver—except again it does not look like a
usual entity-like receiver. Now imagine the engineers try these designs, pick the best
one, make many copies of it—mostly identical but with occasional deviations—and
try them again … This system now satisfies a simple sender–receiver model with a
familiar evolutionary dynamics, although it does not seem representational.

Next, consider this voltage regulator (Figure 1.8), a safeguard against sudden surge
of power. Like the Watt governor, the regulator is a simple negative feedback device.
There is an iron core suspended midair (think of the diagram as a view from above)
next to a solenoid. The core is joined to a switch to its left (not labeled in the diagram)
by a rigid bar. The solenoid produces a magnetic field proportional to the output
voltage, attracting the core and thus pulling the switch to the right. This is counteracted by a spring pulling the switch to the left. As long as the input voltage is not too
high, the spring will win the tug of war and keep the switch closed, in which case
the output voltage is equal to the input. If the input voltage becomes too high, the
magnetic field of the solenoid will overcome the spring’s tension and the switch will
be pulled open. Then the output voltage, now provided by the capacitor, will begin to
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fall, and fall until it is low enough that the solenoid can no longer keep the switch
open, at which point the input power will be engaged once again.

input
spring

core

solenoid

output
Figure 1.8. A voltage regulator.

Does this look like a representational system? What is representing what? As
with the Watt governor, the folk reaction is probably no, nothing representational to
see here.
However, the regulator does satisfy a simple sender–receiver model, one that is
based on the same Bayesian network (our old friend Figure 1.3) as the lantern system
and the Watt governor. The relevant state is the output voltage; it may be too high,
or not too high. The signal is the strength of the magnetic force felt by the iron core
(or the strength of the force pulling the switch to the right). There are two acts: the
switch being pulled closed, or open. The signal is influenced by the state. The act
is influenced by the signal. The signal, moreover, screens off the act from the state:
once you know the strength of the magnetic force felt by the core, information about
the output voltage will not tell you anything new about the position of the switch.
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As for the dynamics, our options are again diverse. Since evolution has been used
on the Watt governor, let’s try reinforcement learning on the regulator.
Suppose the regulator’s goal is to keep the output voltage below v0 . This requires
the coordination of two distances: the distance between the solenoid and the core,
and the distance (or length) to which the spring is stretched. If you hold the spring’s
length fixed and move the solenoid away from the core, the critical voltage at which
the switch will flip will become higher (because, as the solenoid is father away, it needs
a stronger magnetic force, and hence a higher output voltage, to pull the switch open).
The same will happen if you hold the solenoid–core distance fixed and stretch the
spring. On the other hand, if you move the solenoid toward the core, or let the spring
shrink, you will be setting the critical voltage lower. I choose to focus on these two
distances—two degrees of freedom—again for a reason. The solenoid–core distance
determines which signal will be sent (i.e., how much magnetic force will be exerted
on the core) given a certain output voltage. It does the work of the sender—except it
does not look quite like one. The spring’s stretched length determines which action
will be taken (to open or to close the switch) given a certain signal (the strength of
the magnetic force on the core). It does the work of the receiver—except, again, it
does not look like one.
Now a regulator capable of reinforcement learning might be built like this: connect
the output to a voltage meter, the kind that has a pointer. Use the pointer as a switch,
so that it will close a circuit when it points to or past v0 , and the circuit once closed
will activate a motor that will slightly nudge the solenoid toward the core, or slightly
shrink the spring … you get the idea. The sender and the receiver—the distance
between the solenoid and the core, and the distance to which the spring is stretched—
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will learn to adjust themselves to set the critical voltage right. Will the system look
more representational? Hardly.

The Watt governor and the voltage regulator are what I call para-representational
systems: systems that, despite satisfying the same formal models as clearly representational systems, somehow do not appear to be representational to the folk’s eye and
do not require to be explained in representational terms.
Para-representational systems are the little pebbles I plan to hurl at the representational Goliath. I do not greatly care what folk intuitions are—exactly where they draw
lines between representational and non-representational systems, between beliefs and
merely belief-like states, etc. I do care whether it is possible to draw a line somewhere
which (a) makes representation explanatorily relevant and (b) is not too far away
from the line (or gray zone) that the folk might draw. If a line is drawn to include
the Watt governor and the voltage regulator as representational systems, it seems
to me to violate the second condition. It also, more importantly, violates the first
condition, because even the most devoted fans have to admit that representation has
no business in explaining the working of the Watt governor and the voltage regulator.
On the other hand, if a line is drawn to exclude the governor and the regulator from
the set of representational systems, it will also violate the condition of explanatory
relevance. For if I’m right that the governor and the regulator satisfy, and are thus
explained by, the same explanatory model as the lantern system, then the fact that
one of the three systems is representational while the other two are not cannot be
explanatorily relevant.
Some philosophers may say, “The simple sender–receiver model must be incom27

plete or under-described. It must have failed to capture something, some feature, that
is necessary to a system’s representational credential.” I challenge those philosophers
to name one such thing in the lantern system.
Some philosophers may say, “Fine, the folk concepts are too restrictive. Let’s
expand them. Para-representational systems are representational. The height of the
balls do represent the engine’s output to the throttle valve. Well-motivated revision
of folk concepts is perfectly acceptable.” I do not disagree with those philosophers
except on fashion choices. They prefer to keep wearing too short a tie by stretching it.
I would buy a new one, at least for serious occasions.

1.4 Another Para-representational System
The discussion so far has centered around the lantern system, but it is not the only
system that has para-representational doppelgängers. Consider how a blue jay might
learn to avoid eating nasty monarch butterflies. According to Dretske (1988), the jay
needs to have the following pieces assembled in its little body: (1) an indicator, which
will fire up if it detects monarch butterflies;5 (2) an effector, which may be activated
by a firing indicator to which it is wired, and which when activated will stop the
jay from eating; and (3) a learning mechanism. Presumably the jay has lots of food
indicators, some firing up at peanuts, some at grasshoppers, etc. What the learning
mechanism does, roughly, is to strengthen the wiring between an indicator and the
eating-inhibiting effector when the indicator’s firing is accompanied by eating and ill
feelings.
5 Dretske is not entirely consistent on the “if ”.

Sometimes he says “if and only if ”. As you will see, it
does not matter to my argument which version I choose, so I choose the weaker one.
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For my purpose it does not matter whether Dretske is right that this is how the
jay learns (though I don’t see how he could be wrong on this abstract level). Nor
does it matter whether he is right to model an entire theory of representation on
the learning jay (probably not; even disregarding my general objection to taking
representation seriously, the objection by Godfrey-Smith 1992 is devastating). What
matters now is only this: whether a hypothetical jay, or a hypothetical part of a jay,
which has learned to shun monarch butterflies in the Dretskean way, is a central case
of a representational system. I think it is; perhaps not as central as the lantern system,
but central enough to make for an alternative beginning of this chapter. It is therefore
relevant to ask whether this system has para-representational doppelgängers.
What formal model would describe this system? It turns out that a moderate
corruption of the simple sender–receiver model will do: Figure 1.9. There are two
states (the presence or absence of monarch butterflies); two signals (the firing or
silence of the monarch butterfly indicator); and two acts (to eat, or not to eat). All the
dependencies are right. In particular, the signal screens off the jay’s dining behavior
from the presence of monarch butterflies. This model would have been almost
identical to the simple sender–receiver model but for one important difference: in
the simple sender–receiver model the stabilizing force acts on both the S → M and
M → A dependencies, whereas here S → M is fixed (the monarch-butterfly indicator,
wired or not, undergoes no change in its strategy, which is to fire up if the jay eats a
monarch-butterfly), and the stabilizing force only gets to modify M → A (only the
indicator–effector wiring gets stronger). There is also a relatively minor corruption in
M → A: whereas in the lantern system the stabilizing force shapes Revere’s response
to both signals, here the stabilizing force has no effect on the effector’s response to
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Figure 1.9. The jay model. The stabilizing force only acts on half of the
M → A dependency, increasing the probability that the jay will not eat when
the monarch-butterfly indicator is firing.

the silence signal (hence only one relevant row in the table for A).
Now the following may be a para-representational doppelgänger of the jay system.
Imagine a big table dotted by round holes of various sizes—just like a billiard table,
except the holes are spread out all over the table and not uniformly big. Under each
hole there is a tunnel that leads to the basement. Iron balls of various sizes roll
across the table one by one. (To keep it simple, there is always exactly one ball on the
table.) There are enough holes that each ball will eventually run over one big enough,
and then fall through the tunnel into the basement. The tunnels are rather fragile,
though. They hold balls smaller than size L—and thus lighter than 50 g—just fine, but
anything bigger (thus heavier) will cause a fracture. Eventually, one by one, all those
tunnels collapse that were once attached to holes big enough to allow L-sized balls
through. Without a tunnel a falling ball just falls to the floor, not into the basement.
Observing this, you might think of the jay. The system comprising the holes, the
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tunnels, the floor, the basement, and perhaps gravity is just like the jay, isn’t it? It has
learned to avoid taking into the basement balls sized L or larger (sized L+, for short).
This happens thanks to three things, just as in the case of the jay. (1) The L+ indicator,
which is the set of all the holes that would allow an L-sized or larger ball through, and
which will “fire up” (i.e., allow a ball through one of its constituent holes) if an L+ ball
is rolling across.6 (2) The effector, that is the floor, which prevents balls from falling
into the basement. And (3) a learning mechanism which, through the collapses of
the tunnels (an expression of ill feelings?), selectively strengthens the wiring of the
L+ indicator to the effector (the floor, that is).
And I would say you are right. This tunnel system indeed satisfies the same model
as the jay. There are two states: the ball currently rolling across the table is sized L+,
or smaller. There are two signals: a ball falling through an L+ hole (the firing of the L+
indicator), or no ball falling through an L+ hole (the silence of the L+ indicator). And
there are two acts: let the ball fall into the basement, or not. And all the dependencies
are right. As with the jay, the learning process does not modify the dependence of
the signal on the state. Given there are enough L+ holes on the table, the chance of
one of them allowing a ball through, given that an L+ ball has been rolling across, has
always been and will always be one. On the other hand, also mirroring the jay system,
the learning process does modify the dependence of the acts on one of the signals,
namely a ball falling through an L+ hole (the firing of the L+ indicator). Every time a
6 This is an “if ” indicator:

if the currently running ball is L+, it will (given enough time) necessarily
fall into an L+ hole, firing up the indicator. But not only if : small balls may fire up this indicator as
well, since firing is defined as any ball falling through an L+ hole regardless of size. If you would like
to have an “if and only if ” indicator, imagine that the holes are arranged in order of increasing size: a
ball will run through first an area dotted by the smallest holes; then an area of slightly bigger holds;
then an area of even bigger holes, and so on; so that a ball will always fall through a hole that’s just big
enough for it.
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tunnel collapses, it increases the chance that a ball falling through an L+ hole will
be stopped by the floor and reduces its chance of reaching the basement, thereby
reducing the chance of an L+ ball getting there.
Does this look like a representational system? Does the signal—a ball coming
through an L+ hole—represent the ball as being sized L+? You be the judge. If the
answer is no, then this is another pebble I can throw.

This chapter is the first half of my iconoclast attempt. Chapter 3 will be the other half.
In the next chapter I will watch my own back for a while. Sender–receiver models
may handle a simple system like Revere’s just fine, but how much potential do they
have as a general explanatory framework? A particularly threatening problem is that
the simple models discussed in this chapter are utterly incapable of accounting for
the (admittedly very plausible) existence of purely indicative and purely imperative
signals. We really need a more sophisticated model, but what could it be? The next
chapter will propose an answer.
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2
Indicative and Imperative Signals
Some signals are purely indicative. “Orange marmalade” informed Alice of what
was in the jar (or rather, what used to be in it, since it was now empty). It did not
tell her what to do. Some signals are purely imperative, such as the words “Eat me”
beautifully marked in currants on the very small cake Alice found. It commanded
her to do something, but gave her little idea of the strange world she was in.
Some signals do both. A lantern in the belfry of the Old North Church indicates
an attack by land and commands Revere to get ready for the attack. Lewis (1969) calls
this kind of signal “hybrid”; Millikan (1995, 2005) calls it “pushmi-pullyu”. As Lewis
already recognized, the hybrid kind of signal is the only kind possible in a simple
sender–receiver model like the one he developed.
Should we modelists worry about purely indicative and purely imperative signals?
It is true that most, if not all, non-human animals seem to get by using just those hybrid
signals: think of bees’ waggle dance, or vervet monkeys’ alarm calls (Cheney and
Seyfarth 1990; Harms 2004). Simple models can take us a long way. But the modelist’s
ambition does not stop at species boundaries. We believe—at least I believe—that the
sender-receiver model is a general framework for explaining representations (and
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para-representations, I hasten to add). And my iconoclast attempt is only damaging to
the extent that this belief is true: the argument, “same model, therefore explanatorily
equivalent”, may be airtight, but will not be very significant if the said model does not
explain very much—and especially if it cannot explain such apparently fundamental
facts as the separation of indicativeness from imperativeness. I need to show that
it can.

2.1 Taking Aim
What is the difference between indicative and imperative? It is unwise to be committed
too early to too specific an answer to this question—that the indicative signals have
one “direction of fit” and the imperative ones have another, or whatever. But some
initial characterization is unavoidable if we are even to know what kind of thing to
look for. I will discuss two ideas. The first one I reject, the second I endorse.
Correlational asymmetry
The idea, first suggested by Zollman (2011) and endorsed by Martínez and Klein (2016),
is that indicative signals are strongly correlated with states but weakly correlated with
acts, and that the asymmetry is reversed for imperative signals (strong correlations
with acts, weak with states).
This idea has some plausibility. If we could tabulate all the occasions on which
“It’s raining” was ever sincerely uttered, we would probably find that most of them
occurred on a rainy day but otherwise had little in common. If we could examine all
the utterances of “Shut the door!”, we would probably find that most of them (at least
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most of those directed at a cooperative audience) were followed by someone shutting
a door. (Most of those utterances would also be correlated with there being an open
door. But let this problem pass, since I have other objections in store.) Also to its
credit, the idea of the indicative/ imperative distinction as a correlational asymmetry
delivers the verdict that we have already reached regarding the lantern system, namely
that the lanterns, being equally well correlated with states and actions, are not pure
signals.
Zollman’s model for the two kinds of signals is accordingly designed (though I
feel tempted to say “contrived”) to generate a correlational asymmetry: imagine Rick
and Ron moving a couch, Rick in front and Ron at the rear, and Smith helps them by
signaling whether the couch is tipping forward or backward. (They all want to hold it
level.) Now one kind of optimal equilibria in this game would have Smith adopt the
strategy of sending a signal—say, waving a red flag—to both Rick and Ron when the
couch is tipping forward, and a different signal (a white flag) to both of them when
the couch is tipping backward. The receivers then respond to the same flag differently:
on seeing red, Rick lifts his end and Ron lowers his; on seeing white, Rick lowers and
Ron lifts. In this equilibrium each flag is perfectly correlated with a state of the couch,
but the correlation of a flag with the receivers’ action is zero. Or, more precisely, while
a flag is perfectly correlated with Rick’s action and also perfectly correlated with Ron’s
action, since their actions are never the same, the correlation between a signal and a
randomly selected receiver’s action averages out to zero. Knowing one variable gives
no information of the other. Zollman thinks that this asymmetry justifies saying that
the flags are purely indicative signals: red means “tipping forward” and white means
“tipping backward”, and neither commands actions.
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There is another kind of equilibria, also optimal, where Smith waves different
flags to different receivers: say red to Rick and white to Ron when the couch is tipping
forward, and white to Rick and red to Ron when the couch is tipping backward. In this
equilibrium the same flag elicits the same response from both receivers: red always
causes lifting and white always causes lowering. While the correlation between
a signal and an action (even that of a randomly selected receiver) is perfect, the
correlation between the state of the couch and a randomly selected signal (without
knowing whether it is for Rick or Ron) is zero, and these signals are therefore, in
Zollman’s view, purely imperative.
There is a serious problem with Zollman’s model, however—specifically, with his
way of calculating correlations, which he describes simply as “averaging over both
receivers”. The natural way to understand this is that every receiver’s action counts.
This indeed seems to be what Zollman means, judging from how he explains why,
say, the state–signal correlation is zero in the second kind of equilibria just described:
“Knowing that a randomly chosen receiver has received [the red flag] gives us no
information about the state, despite the fact that it gives us perfect information about
the act” (p. 166, my emphasis). But this would mean that whether a signal is indicative
or imperative—or how close it approaches pure indicativeness or imperativeness—is
sensitive to the proportions of the receivers of each kind. But that’s a wrong kind of
sensitivity.
Here is an example. Suppose the couch is much heavier at the front than at the
rear. Rick alone can’t handle it. He calls Ralph, Raymond, and Ryan for help. The
four of them together carry the front end. This doesn’t affect the equilibria. In an
(allegedly indicative) equilibrium, when the couch is tipping forward, Smith will
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wave the red flag, just as before; whoever at the front will lift and whoever at the
rear will lower, just as before. But now there are four receivers at the front: four
lifting to one lowering. By averaging over individual receivers, the red flag is strongly
correlated with lifting. Indeed, the correlation can be made arbitrarily strong—
arbitrarily approaching one—by adding more and more people at the front end. If
imperativeness (here I don’t mean pure imperativeness, but imperativeness that might
co-exist with indicativeness, as in a hybrid signal) is defined by strong correlation with
actions, then just by adding people at the front end of the couch we can turn the red
flag from a purely indicative signal to a hybrid signal with almost equal amounts of
indicativeness and imperativeness. This cannot be right. Whatever a purely indicative
(or imperative) signal is, it should not owe its purity to something as frivolous as the
number of people needed to carry one end of a couch.
One might try to save Zollman’s general idea by averaging not over individual
receivers, but over the roles that receivers may occupy. However many friends Rick
brings to the job, there are still only two roles for them to occupy: a front-carrier or a
rear-carrier. Now in an indicative equilibrium, if you ask whether any information
can be gained about the action performed in a randomly selected receiver role—front
or rear—from knowing that the red flag has been waved at the receivers occupying
that role, the answer is indeed no. And so the rest of Zollman’s argument remains
unaffected. But this move introduces the requirement that receivers be grouped by
their roles. With this requirement it becomes hard to see how Zollman’s model can
generalize. For many, perhaps most, imperative signals, it is clear that too literal
an interpretation of the couch-moving game, where a role is defined by a spatial
location vis-à-vis a piece of furniture, does not apply. But it is not clear what fig37

urative interpretation does. Just consider “Shut the door”. If we are serious about
demonstrating its (nearly) pure imperativeness, what are the relevant roles we should
consider? People who are close to the said door vs. those who are far away? People
with working limbs vs. those who are wheelchair bound? It is difficult to imagine a
principled answer that would work for Zollman.
Apart from the difficulties arising from Zollman’s implementation of his idea—
perhaps some other model can generate correlational asymmetry without making it
frivolously sensitive or un-generalizable—there is something not quite right with the
idea itself, especially with defining imperativeness as correlation with actions. Consider
the case of the luge racer and three race marshals (I got the inspiration for this example
from Butlin unpublished, though he uses it to make a completely different point).
Each race marshal watches over a segment of the track and will shout “all clear” into
his loudspeaker when that segment is clear. The racer will begin her descent when
and only when she hears three all-clear calls. Now for some reason—perhaps just
because he is the farthest from the racer—Marshall 3’s calls are always the last to arrive.
What happens, then, is that the calls from Marshalls 1 and 2 are perfectly correlated
with the racer staying put, and the calls from Marshall 3 are perfectly correlated with
the racer starting descent. If imperativeness is defined by correlation with actions,
we will have to regard the first two marshalls’ calls as ordering the racer to stay put
and the third marshall’s as ordering her to go. Moreover, if the third marshall now
switches to radio, so that his calls outrace those of the second marshall, then suddenly
(or, if you are a teleosemanticist, after a while) his calls will acquire a meaning that is
exactly the opposite of what it used to be. But surely the correlational facts in this
case are too accidental in their origins to make such great differences in meaning.
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To say that some correlational facts are too accidental to be relevant is not to
say that correlational facts are never significant. If you are a field linguist trying to
differentiate indicative utterances from imperative ones in an unknown language,
looking for correlations with states versus actions may well be your best strategy.
But from this it does not follow that correlational asymmetry is the right way to
characterize the indicative/imperative distinction. It is possible that correlational
asymmetry is merely a symptom (with false positives) of some underlying facts of
the world that is the true origin of the distinction. In fact I think this is not just a
possibility; it is true. This brings me to another idea, which I do endorse.
Deliberative asymmetry
The idea, first suggested by Lewis in a limited form and which I endorse in its full
generality, is that the difference between indicativeness and imperativeness is how
the labor of deliberation is divided between the sender and the receiver. To the extent
the sender has to deliberate more, the signal is imperative; to the extent the receiver
has to deliberate more, the signal is indicative; when both sides have about the same
amount of deliberation to do, which could be zero, the signal is hyprid.
I have stated this idea in full generality, allowing a sliding scale with deliberation exclusively by the sender (pure imperativeness) at one end, and deliberation
exclusively by the receiver (pure indicativeness) at the other. This perhaps makes the
idea less intuitively obvious than if we had just focused on the two ends, as Lewis
did. A purely indicative signal (indicating, say, my education in my résumé) leaves
the receiver completely free to decide what to do with it. A purely imperative signal
(“Shut the door”) leaves no room for the receiver at all; the sender has already decided
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what the receiver ought to do.
As further evidence for the deliberative asymmetry, notice that indicative signals
routinely work together to enable further deliberation, whereas imperative signals
(to the extent they are pure) work alone. If you are driving and I tell you “We are
low on gas” and then, “There is a gas station around the corner”, these two signals
together will produce an action that each of them alone would not have produced.
Compare with imperatives: “Exercise regularly. Smoke less.” All right, I will do both.
But the two imperatives will not, except by accident, prompt a third action each of
them alone would not have prompted.
While the Lewisian deliberative asymmetry is in competition with Zollman’s correlational asymmetry, evidence-wise it stands in a position from which it cannot lose.
Because a deliberative asymmetry will naturally generate a correlational asymmetry.
When the sender simply reports a state and leaves the receiver to do whatever she
wants, the signal naturally assumes strong correlation with the state and weak correlation with the action. When the sender has decided what the receiver should do, the
receiver will more often than not do it (communication being the largely cooperative
enterprise it is), but there is no telling which aspects of the state the sender based his
decision on. This results in strong correlation between signals and actions, but not
between signals and states. Thus whenever a correlational asymmetry is shown to
exist for a more or less pure signal (which asymmetry is the main evidence in favor
of Zollman’s view), this evidence will also be consistent with, and indeed predicted
by, the Lewisian deliberative asymmetry. But unlike Zollman’s view, the Lewisian
view is not plagued by correlational asymmetries of dubious origins: if a correlational
asymmetry is not generated by some deliberative asymmetry then it is not relevant.
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As far as I can see, compared to Zollman’s view the Lewisian view has all the virtues
and none of the vices.
The problem is how to put the Lewisian idea to work in a well-motivated and
tolerably plausible model. So far Huttegger (2007b) is the only one to have tried.
Huttegger conceives a double-game, a game comprising of two sub-games. One
sub-game is a simple signaling game with complete common interest of the sextonand-Revere kind, with its usual equilibria. In the other sub-game, the two players
choose whether to deliberate or not, without knowing the choice of the other, and
independently of the state that obtains or the signal received. They get a positive
payoff in this sub-game if exactly one of them deliberates; zero payoff if both deliberate
or neither does. This sub-game gives rise to two equilibria, one where the sender
deliberates and one where the receiver does. The whole game thus contains the
following two kinds of equilibria:

(1)

(2)

Sender strategy

Receiver strategy

If S1 , deliberate and send M1 .

If M1 , do A1

If S2 , deliberate and send M2 .

If M2 , do A2

Sender strategy

Receiver strategy

If S1 , send M1 .

If M1 , deliberate and do A1 .

If S2 , send M2 .

If M2 , deliberate and do A2 .

Huttegger claims that the signals in the first kind of equilibria are purely indicative
because only the receiver deliberates, and that the signals in the second kind of
equilibria are purely imperative because only the sender does.
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This model hardly does justice to Lewis’s idea. The reason it falls short is that
deliberation exists in this model in name only. Nothing in the model suggests that
what is labeled “deliberation” really is deliberation. If we relabel it “decay”, the model
would work just the same, giving rise to exactly the same kinds of equilibria, in one of
which only the sender decays and in the other only the receiver decays—except now it
is obvious that this model has nothing to do with Lewis’s idea or the indicative/imperative distinction. Worse, the way the model is set up makes it positively implausible to
believe that the label could be true, because when a strategy calls for “deliberation” it
also makes the result of the deliberation a foregone conclusion. Consider the receiver
in the second equilibrium, for example. When she receives M2 , her strategy book
tells her to “deliberate and do A2 ”. What she is called to do is no more deliberation
than a rigged election is an election. A limiting case of deliberation, perhaps. But
then we are still left to wonder how genuine, or at least plausible-looking, deliberation
should fit in a sender–receiver model.

2.2 Gradual Revelation
To put genuine deliberation into a sender–receiver model, I think we should begin
with this question: why should the sender leave deliberation to the receiver at all?
Take the simple model, “One if by land, two if by sea.” In that model the sender, the
sexton, is practically omniscient. He knows everything of interest. Or, even if he does
not, he still knows more than Revere does. That’s why the sexton is the sender, after
all—why Revere would ask him to hang lanterns in the first place. Doesn’t it stand to
reason that the one who knows more should do all the deliberation there is to do?
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What good could come out of shifting the burden to someone who knows less?
In simple models there is indeed nothing to be gained by shifting the burden
of deliberation to the receiver; hence no general reason to expect purely indicative
signals to evolve. There may be advantages attached to special circumstances: perhaps
the sender is too lazy or too stupid to do the job properly, so the receiver has to take
it into her own hands. But this cannot be the general reason why we have purely
indicative signals. Smart and industrious people also say “It’s raining”, and (if you are
a teleosemanticist) there is no reason to think that it is some historical laziness or
stupidity that is making them say it.
But there is a general reason—indeed, a mathematical reason—why smart and
industrious senders may choose to leave deliberation to receivers, provided the
following three assumptions hold. Happily, they do hold pretty generally. Here are
the first two:
(1)

The sender does not know everything of interest, at least not at the beginning.

(2)

The sender can gain new information gradually.

These two assumptions are not by themselves very significant. They do not necessitate
any departure from simple sender–receiver models. Suppose the sexton was initially
in the dark about where the British troops were going, just like Revere, but he learned
about it in time. No problem, the coordination problem would be solved in the usual
way: “one if by land”, etc. Here “in time” is crucial. Had the sender but world enough
and, crucially, time, then his initial ignorance would do no harm. It might take the
sexton three months to find out about the British troops’ deployment. He might
find out about it in one fell swoop, or little by little, by painstakingly accumulating
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evidence. After he found out about the British’s deployment he might still decide to
not tell Revere for another two weeks. As long as the lanterns were guaranteed to be
ready the night Revere had to act, all these vicissitudes and procrastination would
make no difference.
The coordination problem will be fundamentally altered, however, once we add
this third assumption:
(3)

The sender undergoes at least two states of knowledge that are worth communicating.

The following example shall explain what I mean. Imagine a general and a spy on the
same side of a war (I could have used the sexton and Revere, but I want keep them
as characters in simple models). The enemy is planning to do one of five things (S1 ,
…, S5 ), and each enemy action calls for a different response from the general (A1 , …,
A5 ), which has to be done on Friday. The general has no way to observe what the
enemy is doing. The spy does not know either—at the beginning, that is. He will,
however, find it out gradually, piece by piece. Starting from Monday, the spy can rule
out one possible enemy action every day. Thus every day he gets into a new, better,
state of knowledge, having ruled out one more possibility. His state of knowledge will
keep improving until the end of Thursday, by which time he will be in the best state
possible: he will have known exactly what the enemy is going to do. However, the spy
may not survive that long. Every day there is a non-zero chance of him being exposed.
Given this risk, every state of knowledge the spy may undergo—except the one of
complete ignorance he has at the very beginning—becomes worth communicating, in
the sense that communicating this knowledge to the general, however incomplete
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it may be at the time, would result in a better outcome than non-communication.
For example, suppose that on Monday night the spy learns that the enemy is not
going to do S1 . If he were guaranteed to survive for at least another day, to find out
more, and to send a more informative message to the general later, then sitting on
his current information makes no difference. But there is no such guarantee. He
may die before finding out more, or before managing to get out a more informative
message. Obviously the spy should tell the general that the enemy is not going to
do S1 right away. In other words, telling the general right away strictly dominates
telling the general later. This is the sense in which I say that a state of knowledge is
worth communicating: communicating it right away (or as soon as possible) strictly
dominates communicating it later. That the enemy is not going to do S1 is worth
communicating, and so are all the later (and better) states of knowledge that the spy
may have the luck to obtain.
It should be obvious why Assumption 3 requires at least two communicationworthy states of knowledge. If there is only one—say if the spy will not find out
the enemy action little by little, but in one fell swoop on Wednesday, if he is still
alive—then what the spy should do is wait until Wednesday (while hoping for the
best) and then send a single message. This situation is again strategically identical
to that of the sexton and Revere. The sexton also has exactly one state of knowledge
worth communicating, except he, unlike the spy, has it since the very beginning. In
other words, the sexton is guaranteed to survive to the point where he obtains that
one (and only) communication-worthy state of knowledge. In such situations the
sender strategy is always to get into that state (or to wait until circumstances put
him into it), and then signal once. When all three assumptions hold, however—the
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A1
A2
A3

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

1
0
0

1
0
0

0
1
0

0
1
0

0
0
1

Table 2.1. Payoffs in the spy game.

sender does not know everything to begin with, he may get to know more later, and
he may undergo at least two states of knowledge that are worth communicating—
the coordination problem becomes fundamentally different. The problem is now
time-sensitive.
If the sender in a simple sender–receiver model is blessed with instant revelation,
then in a time-sensitive coordination problem the sender’s revelation is painfully—
and also more realistically—gradual. Gradual revelation, as I will presently show, can
create room for a beneficial division of deliberative labor, from which signals might
emerge which are either purely indicative or purely imperative.

2.3 A Gradual Revelation Model
Suppose the game has a payoff table like Table 2.1.1 The states are equally probable.
There are three actions for the general to choose from. A1 is right in S1 and S2 , A2 is
right in S3 and S4 , and A3 is right in S5 . (We assume complete common interest, so
the table only shows one number for each state–act combination.)
I shall make two more assumptions about rational agency, just for the ease of
exposition. The equilibria to be described below will exist with or without ratio1 Bayesian networks are not intuitive in this context, so I revert back to the usual way of presenting a

sender–receiver model.
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nal agents, but it is easier to think of them as “what rational agents might choose”.
First, I assume that the spy and the general know the payoff structure of this game.
Second, I assume that they are able to represent probabilities of states and update
them. By this I mean that the spy and the general each keep a subjective probability distribution over the states. It does not matter how they do this, but the
result should be equivalent to a 5-tuple. For example, h1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5i is the
distribution when no state has been ruled out. An update is an operation on the
distribution which follows the rules of probabilistic reasoning. There is only kind
of update in this game: rule out a state. When a player rules out a state, he sets the
probability of that state to zero and normalizes over other states. For my purpose,
I will individuate updates by the state that is being ruled out. Thus an operation
that turns h1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5, 1/5i into h1/4, 0, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4i, and an operation that turns
h1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 0, 1/4i into h1/3, 0, 1/3, 0, 1/3i, are the same update, because both rule out

the second state. I will often refer to an update as just “ruling out state X”.
It will also be convenient to replace tuples with a more economic notation: a
string of five characters, where each character is either a digit, which represents a
state that is not yet ruled out, or a dash if the state has already been ruled out. For
example, 12345 is the initial distribution, when no state has been ruled out. When S2
is ruled out, it becomes 1–345; when S5 is also ruled out, it becomes 1–34–; etc.

There are three types of equilibria in the game I just described, which give rise to
hybrid, purely indicative, and purely imperative signals respectively.
Neutral equilibria. In a neutral equilibrium, the players use the kind of strategy
described in Table 2.2. Every time the spy rules out a state, he updates his distribu47

tion and maps the updated (complete) distribution to a signal. (There are 30 such
distributions that may be worth communicating: 25 = 32, from which we exclude
12345, which is not worth communicating, and –––––, which is not possible.) The
general uses a matching rule that does the reverse, bringing his own distribution up to
date. On Friday, the general chooses the best action according to his most up-to-date
distribution. If it is 12–––, he does A1 ; if it is ––3–5, he randomize between A2 and
A3 ; and so on.
Spy’s strategy

General’s strategy

If –2345, send M1 .
If 1–345, send M2 .
If 12–45, send M3 .
..
.

If M1 , –2345.
If M2 , 1–345.
If M3 , 12–45.
..
.

If –2–––, send M29 .
If 1––––, send M30 .

If M29 , –2–––.
If M30 , 1––––.

Table 2.2. A neutral equilibrium.

Indicative equilibria (Table 2.3). Here the spy maps each of the five states to a
signal. When he rules out a state, he sends a signal for that state. The general updates
his distribution according to the signal. On Friday—and this part is the same as with
the neutral equilibria—the general looks at his last distribution and figures out the
best action. Notice that the general alone does the updating; the spy does not.
Imperative equilibria (Table 2.4). Here the spy is the one doing the updating.
Upon ruling out a state, he updates his probability distribution, works out the best act
(or randomly chooses one of the best) for the general in light of the latest distribution,
and sends a signal for that act. The general lets signals pile up on his desk until, on
Friday, he takes the signal at the top of the pile and acts accordingly.
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Spy’s strategy

General’s strategy

If S1 ruled out, send U1 .
If S2 ruled out, send U2 .
If S3 ruled out, send U3 .
If S4 ruled out, send U4 .
If S5 ruled out, send U5 .

If U1 , rule out S1 .
If U2 , rule out S2 .
If U3 , rule out S3 .
If U4 , rule out S4 .
If U5 , rule out S5 .

Table 2.3. An indicative equilibrium.

Spy’s strategy

General’s strategy

If A1 best, send D1 .
If A2 best, send D2 .
If A3 best, send D3 .

If D1 , do A1 .
If D2 , do A2 .
If D3 , do A3 .

Table 2.4. An imperative equilibrium.

Now consider the latter two types of equilibria. Updating a probability distribution
and figuring out the best action on that basis is a genuine deliberative process, and
in both types of equilibria there is a deliberative asymmetry of the right kind. In
an imperative equilibrium only the spy deliberates. In fact, the general could not
deliberate properly even if he wanted to, because the signals do not preserve all the
information needed for doing a proper update. If the general received, say, D1 on
Tuesday, he would not be able to determine whether the spy ruled out S3 or S4 or
S5 . The opposite is true of the indicative equilibrium: here the general deliberates,
whereas the spy follows a simple rule unthinkingly.
These deliberative asymmetries then begat correlational asymmetries. In an
indicative equilibrium each signal is perfectly correlated with a state. The signal U1 ,
for example, is perfectly correlated with the state not-S1 . (A negatively described
state is also a state.) The correlations between signals and acts are weak. Not only
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would the signals not raise the probability of any act to 1, as they would in Huttegger’s
model, but to the extent they do change probabilities (inevitably), the change is small.
If the general received U1 on Monday night, this would increase the probability of A2
by 0.1, increase the probability of A3 by 0.05, and reduce the probability of A1 by 0.15.
(These numbers can be made arbitrarily small by adding more states while keeping
the number of actions fixed. The greater the number of states that need to be ruled out
before an action becomes completely out of the question, the less the impact of ruling
out one of the states.) The opposite is true of an imperative equilibrium. There the
signals are each perfectly correlated with an act, but their correlations with states are
weak and erratic. If D1 is received on Monday night it would move the probabilities
of S1 and S2 from 1/5 to 1/4 and reduce the probabilities of S3 and S4 from 1/5 to 3/20.
If received on Tuesday night, it would move the probabilities differently—exactly
how depends on which state has been ruled out on Monday. On Friday it would be
redundant and not move the probability of any state at all.
Earlier I mentioned, as evidence for the Lewisian idea, that indicative and imperative signals differ in their synergetic potential. Indicatives can work together;
imperatives tend to work alone. The present model captures some of this difference.
In an imperative equilibrium the general gets signals that always supersede earlier
ones. The last word is truly the last word, and it might as well have been the first: the
arrival of a new signal always renders previous signals irrelevant. Contrast this with
Table 2.5, which shows the effects of the signal that rules out S1 in various situations
in an indicative equilibrium. The signal has most impact when received on Thursday
night, when it is preceded by a maximum number of earlier signals. Depending on
which signals have already been received, it may either reduce the probability of A1
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from 0.5 to 0 and increase the probability of A2 or A3 from 0.5 to 1, or have no effect
at all.
Already
ruled out
none

0.40

0.40

0.20

–0.15

0.10

0.05

tuesday

2
3
4
5

0.25
0.50
0.50
0.50

0.50
0.25
0.25
0.50

0.25
0.25
0.25
0.00

–0.25
–0.17
–0.17
–0.17

0.17
0.08
0.08
0.17

0.08
0.08
0.08
0.00

wednesday

23
24
25
34
35
45

0.33
0.33
0.33
0.67
0.67
0.67

0.33
0.33
0.67
0.00
0.33
0.33

0.33
0.33
0.00
0.33
0.00
0.00

–0.33
–0.33
–0.33
–0.17
–0.17
–0.17

0.17
0.17
0.33
0.00
0.17
0.17

0.17
0.17
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.00

thursday

234
235
245
345

0.50
0.50
0.50
1.00

0.00
0.50
0.50
0.00

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

–0.50
–0.50
–0.50
0.00

0.00
0.50
0.50
0.00

0.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

monday

Pre-update

Differences

Table 2.5. The synergistic effects of the signal that rules out S1 . “Pre-update”
is the probability distribution over the three acts (A1 , A2 , A3 , in this order)
before receiving the signal but after the states in the “already ruled out”
column have been ruled out. “Differences” shows the differences between
the post-update distribution and the pre-update one.

Why is there a distinction between indicative and imperative signals? I do not
know. Like so many other questions about language evolution, this one may never
get a definitive answer. But the gradual revelation model shows why we should not
find the existence of the distinction surprising. In gradual revelation, the sender
does not have the luxury of waiting until she sees the full picture. Every new piece of
information needs to be conveyed as soon as it is obtained. As we have seen, there are
three ways for the sender to convey piecemeal information: do the updates herself
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and encode the conclusion (this gives rise to imperative signals); encode the updates
and let the receiver work them out (this gives rise to indicative signals); or encode
full representations of the world as currently known (probability distributions) and
pass them all to the receiver. The last one—the neutral strategy—has a combinatorial
explosion problem. For n states and m actions, the indicative strategy requires n
signals, the imperative strategy requires m, whereas the neutral strategy requires
2n – 2 (–2 since the states cannot be all ruled out, and the state of total ignorance,
where no state (of the world) has been ruled out, is not worth communicating). The
neutral strategy may be manageable in a 5-state toy game, but not in the real world
where the states number in hundreds and thousands if not more. It is for an excellent
mathematical reason that we do not have names for complete mental pictures of
the world, only names for the relatively few and recurrent pieces that can be moved
around to form a bigger picture, and the relative few and recurrent actions we can take
to change it. When the sender passes these pieces to the receiver, leaving the latter to
put the big picture together and decide how to change it (a process which Lewis, I
think, would have been happy to call “deliberation”), the signals are on the indicative
end. When the sender does the work herself, her signals are on the imperative end.
But there is not an unbridgeable chasm between purely indicative and purely
imperative signals. There is a valley, though perhaps a steep one. The differences
between an indicative and an imperative equilibrium, whether in signals’ correlations
with states and acts or in signals’ synergetic potential, are more pronounced when
states outnumber actions, so that some action is appropriate in more than one state.
The differences are appreciable enough in the model I described, but they will become
much less so if we just eliminate one of the states, or introduce another action which is
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uniquely appropriate in, say, S2 . When each action is uniquely appropriate in exactly
one state, indicative and imperative equilibria will collapse into one, and we will be
at the bottom of the valley, where signals are perfectly hybrid.

2.4 Resisting Reinterpretation
Models of indicative/imperative signals are susceptible to reinterpretation. Take
Zollman’s model for example, and consider the equilibrium where the sender gives
the same signal to both couch-carrying receivers when the couch is tipping forward.
As Zollman himself notes, one may ask, why take the signal to mean “The couch is
tipping forward”? Why not take it to mean that “Lift if you are in the front, lower if
you are in the back”? The problem is not peculiar to Zollman’s way of drawing the
indicative/imperative distinction. If one adopts the Lewisian view that the distinction
is a matter of who deliberates, it is still possible to recast an indicative signal, one that
I would describe as representing a state S, as the imperative-sounding “Do what is
appropriate in state S (but what is appropriate is for you to decide)”. It is also possible
to recast an imperative signal, “Do A”, as the indicative-sounding “Things are such
that (I have decided) you should do A.”
Zollman, in keeping with his view that the distinction is a matter of correlational
asymmetry, tries to defuse the problem by saying that indicative and imperative
signals, even the very “pure” ones, are in fact a bit hybrid (2011, pp. 168–69):
Even English indicatives and imperatives often convey some information
about the state and some information about the act. Knowing that I
have said “run” to someone gives you some information about the world,
namely, that the state was such that I wanted my conversant to run.
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Now I think Zollman is right as far as it goes, but if we accord deliberation its
deserved importance, we can in fact go a little further. Deliberation takes many forms,
of which Bayesian updating (as in my model) is but one, but in general it involves a
reduction of information. The conclusion arrived is typically less informative, paints a
less detailed picture of the world, than the premises from which deliberation proceeds.
If the spy decides that trenches should be dug and tells the general to just do that,
the general may take it to mean that “Things are such that I should dig trenches”, but
would have no way of knowing whether this is because the enemy is going to attack
from the east or from the west. If the direction of attack is relevant to some other
decision the general has to make, he is out of luck: the spy’s signal is not informative
enough to enable that other deliberation. Or again, to pick up Zollman’s example,
even though “Run!” is correlated with the states in which the sender decides that
the receiver should run, that information is generally less specific than the basis on
which the sender decides that the receiver should run (is there an active shooter? or
does the receiver just need a bit of exercise?), and generally quite useless for other
deliberations the receiver might have to perform.
I suggest, therefore, that we have a good reason—stronger than what Zollman
has suggested—to resist the reinterpretation of “Dig trenches” as “The enemy is
attacking from east or west” if information about the direction of attack may be used
for purposes other than deciding whether to dig trenches. I did not build such usage
into the model above, but it is easy to see how it may be done. Just imagine that
the direction of attack also has implications for how the general should position
his troops, and that the optimal position for an attack coming from east is different
from the optimal position for an attack coming from west. Then “the enemy is (not)
54

attacking from east” would be usable in both deliberations, whereas “Dig trenches!”
preempts one deliberation and does not lend itself to the other. And this is exactly how
indicative and imperative signals behave: indicative signals are usable in deliberations
of all sorts, whereas imperative signals preempts some deliberations and are unhelpful
in others.

I said at the end of Chapter 1 that in this chapter I would be watching my own
back. Now I consider myself safe. To be sure, the problem of accounting for the
indicative/imperative distinction has not been completely solved (my model still
lacks a dynamics, for one thing). But it seems to me to have been solved enough
that it now looks solvable. It no longer seems a serious threat to my claim about the
generality of sender–receiver models. In the next chapter I will resume my argument
against taking representation seriously.
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3
A Continuum of Frauds

3.1 The Case of the Owl: The Prosecution’s Case
All the mouse heard was his own unhurried footsteps on the newly fallen snow. Next
thing he knew, an owl—and it was too late. Did the owl deceive the mouse?
A male Photinus firefly saw a flash—a mating signal, a receptive female! He
hurried forward, unaware that the flash came from a Photuris firefly, a predator
(Lloyd 1975). His fate was sealed. Was he deceived?
Most people answer these two questions differently. Almost all agree that the
Photuris deceived its prey, but very few people seem to think that the owl did.1 Why?
Presumably because the flash looks representational: the Photuris’s trick is intuitively
a deceptive representation—a central case of that, even. It is natural to think of an
authentic flash coming from a genuine mate as saying “mate here”, and to think
of a mimicked flash as saying that too, in which case it says something false or at
1 As far as I know, Fallis and Lewis (forthcoming) are the only ones to claim that the Photuris is not a

deceiver. Unfortunately they did not name any case which they would consider a case of deception.
As for the owl, if it or any similar case is mentioned in the literature as a case of deception, I haven’t
found it.
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least misleading. On the other hand, it feels odd to say that the owl is signaling
or representing—representing what? The absence of itself? By not making noise?
Silence does not seem to mean “no owl”; it does not even look like the kind of thing
that can have meanings.
But these are merely intuitions. The modelist looks at the explanatorily relevant
features of the two cases. It turns out that the owl is not that different from the
Photuris.
Consider the fireflies’ system formalized as a sender–receiver model. There are
three states: in the direction in which the male Photinus is looking there is either a
mate, or a predator, or neither. (For simplicity, ignore the possibility that a mate and
a predator are both there.) The male may see one of two signals: a flash, or no flash
(“null”). And there are two acts for the male to choose from: either hurry forward
(“approach”), or keep minding his current business (“stay”). The signal is influenced
by the state, and the act by the signal. Assuming that the male cannot discriminate
between the states except via the presence or absence of a flash, the signal screens
off its action from the state. This is a familiar Bayesian network (not yet dynamic):
Figure 3.1.

Approach
Stay

Mate

Predator

Neither

3, _, 3
0, _, 1

_, 3, 0
_, 0, 1

_, _, 0
_, _, 1

Table 3.1. The numbers in each cell are the payoffs for the female Photinus,
for the Photuris, and for the male Photinus, in this order.

The dynamics is evolutionary. The details do not matter for my purpose, but
assume for concreteness that flashing costs the fireflies nothing, and that without
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null

1
1
0

0
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neither

approach

Figure 3.1

seeing a flash the male Photinus will never approach. Table 3.1 describes a payoff
structure that satisfies these assumptions. (When a player is not part of the encounter
I have left its payoff unspecified, but feel free to deem it zero.) Since flashing strictly
dominates not flashing, genuine mates and predators should both always flash. The
male’s best response depends on the relative frequencies of mates versus predators.
Given the numbers in Table 3.1, the male should be indifferent between approaching
and staying when the chance of a flash coming from a predator is exactly 1/4. If that
chance is actually, say, 1/5, then the model can stabilize at the equilibrium where
systematic deception occurs, as described by the annotations in Figure 3.1. There a
flash is perfectly correlated with the presence of either a mate or a predator, and the
male will always approach it, magnanimously accepting the one-in-five chance of
death.
We can also describe this model in the non-network way. The states, signals, and
acts remain the same. The male Photinus is the receiver, obviously, and the mate
and the predator are two senders. But there is a third sender, whom you may see by
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squinting your eyes: the absence of both mates and predators—yes, absence. As I
argued in Chapter 1, a sender is anything that implements a state–signal dependency,
and this absence does that, albeit inflexibly: it sends the null signal and will always do.
Figure 3.2, then, is a schematic diagram of the system at the deceptive equilibrium
described above. Since each sender will only see one state—its own presence—it
improves clarity to separate the state node into three. (I have also separated the signal
node into two for the same reason.) That the senders will only see their own presence
may seem quite peculiar, but this is not any sleight of hand on my part. It is due to
the self-advertising nature of the signals: the fireflies signal about their own presence,
and they can do that only when they are present (and, by assumption, when no other
sender is).

Forage
Flee

Safety

Owl

Non-owl predator

_ _, 1
_ _, 0

_, 3, 0
_, 0, 1

3, _, 0
0, _, 1

Table 3.2. The numbers in each cell are the payoffs for the non-owl predator,
the owl, and the mouse, in this order. “Safety” denotes the absence of all
predators.

Turning to the owl. There are also three states here: there being no predator, a
silent predator that is the owl, or a noisy predator. Two signals: silence and noise.
And two acts: the mouse may keep foraging or flee. The dependencies all mirror
those in the firefly model—all appropriate for a Bayesian network (Figure 3.3). To
keep mirroring the firefly model, I assume the payoffs in Table 3.2, and assume that
the chance of an owl being present given that the mouse hasn’t heard any noise is 1/5.
Thus foraging is the better strategy when all is quiet. This model has an equilibrium
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mate

mate
flash

predator

predator

male

act outcome

null
neither

neither

Figure 3.2. “Neither” is the absence of both mates and predators. Dashed
lines represent the stabilizing force.

identical to the one that exists in the firefly model, as described in Figure 3.3—
essentially the same figure as 3.1.
Figure 3.4 is a non-network diagram of the owl model. It mirrors 3.2, except the
male Photinus has turned into the mouse; the predatory Photuris has turned into the
owl; the female Photinus has turned into the absence of all predators (a condition I
call “safety”); and the absence of both mates and predators for the male Photinus has
turned into the presence of a noisy predator for the mouse. The signals are the senders’
self-advertisements, as in the firefly model. (Here safety is also a strange sender, but
it deserves to be so called no less than the absence-of-both-mates-and-predators in
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safety
owl
non-owl

Figure 3.3

the firefly model. The absence-of-both-mates-and-predators sends darkness; safety
sends silence.)
You may want to juxtapose Figure 3.3 with 3.1, and 3.4 with 3.2, to see how the
two models map onto each other. Or refer to the summary diagram, Figure 3.5. As I
said, and as you can now see, these two models are not that different after all. Their
snapshots are isomorphic, and their dynamics almost identical.
Well, almost. Some differences do exist. The female Photinus (the genuine mate)
keeps flashing because this is her naturally selected dating method. Her equivalent in
the owl model, the strange sender named “safety”, keeps sending silence not because
of selection or any stabilizing force; it is just an immutable fact about the world that
if nothing is making noise, then no noise is made. (Hence a dashed line pointing
to “mate” in Figure 3.2, and none pointing to “safety” in 3.4.) The stabilizing forces
also treat the senders of the unfakeable signals differently. The sender of no-flash
in the firefly model—the absence of both mates and predators—is immutable like
“safety”; it will keep on not sending firefly-flashes till the end of the universe. But the
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safety

safety
silence

owl

mouse

owl

act outcome

noise
non-owl

non-owl

Figure 3.4. “Safety” denotes the absence of all predators. The “non-owl” is a
noisy, non-owl predator. Dashed lines represent the stabilizing force.

sender of noise in the owl model—that noisy predator—may still aspire to become
like an owl in maybe a few million years (and hence a dashed line pointing to it in
Figure 3.4).
The question is how much these differences matter. In section 3.3 I will argue that
they matter only a little, not enough to acquit the owl. But before I do so, I want to call
some major expert witnesses to testify on the owl’s case: Skyrms (2010), McWhirter
(2016), Artiga and Paternotte (2018), and some others. Most of these expert witnesses
will convict the owl, perhaps to their own surprise (the surprise is part of the point of
calling them). You will also see that anyone who might want to try to acquit the owl
will not find the job easy.
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Figure 3.5. Above: the firefly model. Below: the owl model.

3.2 Expert Witness Statements
Skyrms. According to Skyrms (2010, pp. 75, 80), deception occurs when (1) a misleading signal is sent (by “misleading” he means that the signal raises the probability of a
non-actual state), and (2) by sending the signal the sender benefits at the expense of
the receiver.
As an illustration, consider the simple sender–receiver model with three equally
probable states and the payoff structure as shown in Table 3.3 (from Skyrms 2010,
p. 81). Both players prefer act 2 in state 3, but they disagree about the other two states.
The receiver prefers act 1 in state 1 and act 2 in state 2; the sender prefers act 3 in both
states. The sender is in a position to exploit. He has the following strategy: in state 1
or 2, send signal 1; in state 3, send signal 2. To this the receiver’s best response is:
given signal 1, do act 3 (resulting in act 3 in both states 1 and 2, for a better average
payoff to the receiver than randomly risking the other acts); given signal 2, do act 2
(resulting in act 2 in state 3, to the best interest of both players). This is a strict Nash
equilibrium. Now when signal 1 is sent, it raises both the probabilities of both states 1
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State 1
State 2
State 3

Act 1

Act 2

Act 3

2, 10
0, 0
0, 0

0, 0
2, 10
10, 10

10, 8
10, 8
0, 0

Table 3.3. Skyrms’s example of deception

and 2, one of which is not actual. This makes signal 1 misleading in Skyrms’s sense.
Also the sender is doing better, and the receiver doing worse, than they would be if
the sender had discriminated between states 1 and 2—if the sender had done that,
the receiver would learn to take the more profitable actions in these two states, to the
detriment of the sender. (Why the baseline for measuring benefit and harm should
be the condition of fully discriminating signaling rather than, say, no signaling at
all, as favored by Shea et al. (2017), Skyrms does not explain.) Since signal 1 raises
the probability of a non-actual state and benefits the sender to the detriment of the
receiver, it is a deceptive signal.
I will bypass some quite cogent criticisms of Skyrms’s theory (e.g., Fallis and Lewis
forthcoming), and especially of the above model as a good example of deception
(Godfrey-Smith 2011). Suppose those criticisms are not fatal (indeed the critics do
not claim they are), and suppose that with more bells and whistles the core of the
Skyrmsian view can be preserved. What would it say about the owl?
Well, the silence of the owl eliminates the possibility of a noisy predator, and
by doing so raises the probability of an owl and the probability of there being no
predator. The latter is not the actual state. So the owl’s silence is misleading. And it
obviously benefits the owl at a deadly cost to the mouse. So by Skyrms’s lights the
owl is guilty of deception.
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More bells and whistles are not likely to reverse this verdict. One thing that can be
tweaked is Skyrms’s definition of misleadingness—and some tweaking it clearly needs.
As it is, Skyrms’s definition implies that any signal that does not outright eliminate all
non-actual states is misleading because it is bound to raise the probabilities of some of
the remaining non-actual states.2 (Look here, three boxes. There is a candy in one of
them. Let me open Box One for you. See, it’s empty. Now I have misled you, according
to Skyrms, because I have raised the probability of the candy being in Box Two when
it is actually in Box Three.) However, a better definition of misleadingness will still
have to supervene on the change to the receiver’s “situation” in some sufficiently broad
sense. But the parity between the mouse and the male Photinus is solid: the owl’s
silence changes the mouse’s situation, however broadly understood—epistemically,
or payoff-wise—in exactly the same way as the fake flash changes the male Photinus’s
situation, however broadly understood. There is just not enough room for the two
signals to differ in misleadingness.
Or Skyrms may take up Godfrey-Smith’s idea (2011) that for a signal to qualify as
deceptive, it must be “non-maintaining”: were the signal to become more common it
would undermine its own effectiveness.3 Again this will not alter the guilty verdict.
True, the fake flash is non-maintaining. Were it to become more common, “stay”
would eventually become a better response than “approach”, and the entire signaling
system, the honest as well as the deceitful, would collapse. But the same is true of
the owl. Were owls and their lethal silence to become more common, silence would
become less safe. The mouse would become more skittish, more vigilant, take more
2 This is pointed out by Fallis and Lewis (forthcoming). The following example is also theirs.
3 A plausible idea, but perhaps it does not hold universally: see Martínez (2015).
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cover and do less foraging, all rendering the owl’s silence less useful. In the extreme,
imagine there is no silence-trusting preys foraging in the open any more, in which
case the owl can be expected to lose its silent flight—to stop sending silence.

The Misuse Theory. This theory (McWhirter 2016) is a revision of Skyrms’s. McWhirter
keeps Skyrms’s requirement that the deceptive signal be beneficial to the sender and
harmful to the receiver, but replaces the requirement that the signal be misleading
with the requirement that it be misused.
The difference lies in the baseline for measuring the movement of probabilities.
For Skyrms, as noted above, a signal is misleading if the posterior probability of a nonactual state given a signal is higher than the state’s prior probability. For McWhirter,
the comparison is to be made not with the prior, but with a population-average
posterior, relative to a population of senders. Signal M, from sender A in state S,
is misused if and only if (1) S becomes more likely after receiving M from A than
it would be had the signal come from an average sender; and (2) some non-actual
state, S*, become less likely after receiving M from A than it would be had the signal
come from an average sender. Since the receiver treats the signal as coming from an
average sender—what else can she do?—a misused signal has the effect of making
the receiver underestimate the probability of the actual state and overestimate the
probability of some non-actual state.
The misuse theory may avoid some issues with Skyrms’s misleadingness, but it is
no more capable of differentiating the owl from the Photuris. There is no question
that the Photuris is misusing the flash: on average a flash comes from a genuine
mate 80% of the time, and so when it actually comes from an impostor, the male
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Photinus will underestimate the chance of the signal coming from an impostor and
overestimate the chance of it coming from a genuine mate. But the same is again true
of the owl. (The two snapshots, Figures 3.1 and 3.3, are mathematically identical after
all.) The average sender of silence is 80% absence of predators and 20% owl. Thus the
owl’s silence will cause the mouse to underestimate the chance of the its presence and
overestimate its absence: the owl misuses silence, by McWhirter’s definition. And
this misuse benefits the owl and harms the mouse. Hence the verdict: guilty.4

The Functional Account. This theory, due to Artiga and Paternotte (2018), finds
deceptiveness not in the signal—misleading, misused, false, or whatnot—but in
the receiver’s mental state. Indeed Artiga and Paternotte hold that signals are not
necessary for deception to occur at all. They speak instead of “deceptive states”:
making yourself look like a twig when you are not actually a twig is a deceptive state
(provided some other things are true), but they would not call it a signal. I myself
would call anything a signal as long as it fulfills the appropriate role in a formal model
(Chapter 1). Having noted this verbal difference, I shall keep saying “deceptive signal”
where Artiga and Paternotte say “deceptive state”.
According to Artiga and Paternotte (p. 591), a signal M is deceptive if and only if
(1)

M has the (etiological) function of causing a misinformative state
(or failing to acquire a particular piece of information)

4 Recently Birch (2019) puts forward a similar theory, according to which deception occurs when
“the sender elicits a behaviour in the receiver that is beneficial in a different type of situation and is
expressed only because the signal raises the probability, from the receiver’s standpoint, of that type
of situation” (p. 5). Birch rejects the requirement for benefit and harm—which does not matter to
my argument—but the rest of his definition seems identical either to Skyrms’s misleadingness or
to McWhirter’s misuse, depending on what baseline the “the receiver’s standpoint” uses to judge
movements of probabilities. So I won’t treat Birch separately here; if Skyrms and McWhirter both
count a case as deception, Birch will too.
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(2)

M leads to a misinformative state.

What is a misinformative state? Artiga and Paternotte leave it underspecified, as they
want their theory to work at a higher level, compatible with many different definitions
of misinformative state. But this much seems clear: a “misinformative” state is really
a state of being misinformed (as the parenthetical “failing to acquire… information”
seems to suggest). It is the state an animal is in when it believes—or whatever the
right verb is for non-human animals—when it believes something false or inaccurate,
or when it is kept in the dark about something it normally would have known.
Artiga and Paternotte’s theory cannot be used out of box. It has a hole shaped
like a substantive account of misinformed state—or, which presumably has the same
shape but is more familiar, an account of misinformative signals. (They are identically shaped because, presumably, a misinformed state is just what a misinformative
signal normally causes, or has the function of causing.) So Skyrms’s misleadingness,
McWhirter’s misuse, and some broadly teleosemantic theory of false content (which
I discuss in more detail below), may all be tried to plug the hole. To plug the hole
Skyrms-style: you are in a misinformed state if you believe a non-actual state to be
more probable than before. (I will continue to call a “belief ” whatever internal state
that drives the receiver’s response.) To plug the hole McWhirter-style: you are in a
misinformed state if you believe that the sender is acting like an average member of
the sender population when he is not, and consequently believe the actual state to be
less likely and some non-actual state to be more likely than you would have believed if
he were an average sender. And, lastly, to plug the hole in the orthodox-teleosemantic
way: you are in a misinformed state if the conditions for the proper functioning of

68

your current state are not present.
Suppose we try a Skyrmsian or McWhirterian plug. The theory, now fully assembled, is that a signal is deceptive on a certain occasion if and only if it has the
function of causing, and on that occasion does cause, the receiver (a) to believe a
non-actual state to be more probable compared either to the prior probability of the
state (Skyrmsian), or to the posterior of the state given the signal, had the signal
been sent by an average sender (McWhirterian), and (b) (with the McWhirterian
plug, but not the Skyrmsian one) to underestimate the probability of the actual state.
With either plug it is clear that, when they are functioning properly, the owl’s silence
is as much a deceptive signal as the Photuris’s fake flash: it causes the mouse to
underestimate the probability of the actual state (an owl) and to believe a non-actual
state (no predator) to be more probable by either baseline, just as a fake flash causes
the male Photinus to underestimate the presence of a predator and to believe in a
higher probability of the presence of a mate.
Now suppose we try the teleosemantic plug (of the orthodox kind). The result
is a theory that says something along this line: a signal is deceptive on a certain
occasion if and only if it has the function of causing, and on that occasion does cause,
a state in the receiver when the conditions for the proper functioning of that state are
absent. Again this convicts the owl, for the state of the mouse foraging at abandon
functions properly only when no predator is around, not when an owl is silently
approaching from behind. Thus foraging at abandon is a misinformed state when an
owl is approaching from behind. And of course the owl’s silence has the function of
producing exactly this state in the mouse; so it is a deceptive signal after all, guilty as
charged.
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Teleosemantics. This approach, exemplified by Shea et al. (2017), takes as its starting
point the seemingly unproblematic claim
(R)

Deception is done via signals with false contents,

and wed it to a teleosemantic theory of content.
What this approach will actually say about the owl depends on which version of
teleosemantics is chosen. The most consequential choice is between theories that
accept, and those that reject, what some writers have dubbed the “cooperation requirement” for content ascription—the requirement that the sender’s signal production
system and the receiver’s response system be “coevolved in such a way that a Normal
condition for the proper performance of each system is the presence and proper
functioning of the other” (Artiga 2014, p. 360; see also Stegmann 2009). Orthodox
theorists (as I call them), including Millikan, Papineau, Neander, and Shea, accept
the cooperation requirement; revisionists such as Stegmann (2009) and Cao (2012)5
reject it.
I begin with the revisionists. On their view, the content of a signal is determined
solely by the historical conditions that explained the continued maintenance of the
receiver’s response (it does not matter what keeps the sender in the game or whether
there is indeed a sender). Historically the male Photinus’s response to the flash was
successful, and thus maintained, when the flash came from a genuine mate, not when
it came from a predator. So that’s what the flash means: “mate there”. When the
sender is a predator, the flash is false.
5 Presumably Shea et al. (2017) as well, since they ascribe contents to signals in completely antagonistic

interactions (between low-quality males and females who would be better off rejecting them: pp. 16–
18). But two of the three co-authors are not known to be revisionists.
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Against this receiver-centered view one may object that it loses sight of an entire
half of a signaling system; or that it results in a disconcerting proliferation of meanings
(as an exhibit, Stegmann 2009, p. 872: “For mosquitos, a local, higher-than-average
concentration of CO2 is an olfactory cue meaning something like ‘here is a mammal.’ ”). But for my present purpose, it suffices to note that this view convicts the owl.
Historically the mouse’s response to silence—foraging at abandon, etc.—achieved
success when there was no owl coming from behind, and so silence, according to
this view, means something like “there is no owl coming from behind”. When there
is one coming from behind, the silence is false—much to the mouse’s detriment, and
therefore deceptive.
The orthodox theories, on the other hand, are going to acquit the owl on the
grounds that it does not satisfy the cooperation requirement: the owl’s silence production is functioning properly just when the mouse’s response to silence is not
functioning properly, and vice versa. But this conformity with folk intuition is more
than negated by the violation of another intuition: the orthodox theories acquit the
Photuris, too, for that case does not meet the cooperation requirement either. If the
fake-flash-producing system is doing what it has been selected to do, that is precisely
when the male Photinus’s response system is not doing what it has been selected to
do, and vice versa.
Not only do the Photuris and the owl walk free (or fly free, rather), but the
orthodox theorists have to acquit a long list of suspects whose interests are opposed
to those of their victims either diametrically or nearly so—the cuckoo with its eggs,
the angler fish with its lure, the fiddler crab that bluffs away an otherwise unbeatable
challenger, low-quality males of various species pretending to be high-quality to have
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otherwise unrealistic sex, and so on and on. And while in each particular case it
may be arguable whether deception really occurs, the orthodox theorists have the
big picture wrong. Where the sender’s and the receiver’s interests are most strongly
opposed—just where deception seems most likely to biologists and everybody else—
the orthodox theorists are most certain that it does not occur, because the cooperation
requirement is most likely not met. This upside-down picture, I submit, is the most
damning objection against orthodox theories wedded to the claim (R). An orthodox
teleosemanticist may be fine if he rejects (R) (a good thing to do anyway, of which I
will say more below). But for someone taking a teleosemantic approach to deception,
which is committed to (R), an orthodox theory is a non-starter.

In an attempt to solve the orthodox theories’ incompatibility with (R), Artiga (2014)
suggests that maybe the Photuris’s fake flash can be seen as belonging to the same
biological kind as the female Photinus’s authentic one, and thus having the same
content.6 For the relevant notion of biological kind Artiga relies on “something
like” Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster (Boyd 1999). The idea is that there is an
underlying causal mechanism that explains the resemblance of the fake signal to the
authentic one, such that the former can plausibly be said to be a “copy” of the latter.
Thus “the only sender–receiver system is that of the female and male Photinus and,
nonetheless, the Photuris’s flashings are contentful signals in virtue of being copied
from the original signals” (Artiga 2014, p. 371).
This approach may indeed acquit the owl without letting loose a whole bunch of
6 It is not clear how committed he is to this suggestion.

In a later paper, Artiga and Paternotte (2018),
discussed above, he seems to think that fake signals have no content.
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swindlers. The owl’s manufactured silence, the defense attorney can argue, is of the
same kind as natural silence: there is certainly a well-known mechanism—natural
selection—that explains why the manufactured silence sounds very much like the
authentic, no-predator-around silence, and perhaps that would be enough to qualify
the manufactured silence as a “copy” of the authentic one. Now since natural silence
does not (unless one agrees with Stegmann and Cao) mean “there is no owl”—in fact
it does not mean anything—the owl-manufactured silence also has no meaning and
is therefore incapable of being false, and therefore incapable of being deceptive.
While Artiga’s may be the most intuition-comforting position available to an
orthodox teleosemanticist committed to (R), it is a general theme in these chapters
that intuitive lines are often drawn in explanatorily dubious sand. This one is, too.
Consider the orchid, a family of plants known for attracting pollinators by means
that biologists are apt to call deceptive (see e.g. Schiestl 2005, titled “On the success
of a swindle”). Many orchids mimic insect food, but some are “sexually deceptive”,
attracting male bees by mimicking the odor or shape of females.
Now imagine a nice continuum of frauds.
(1) At one end (imagine it is on our left) are cases similar to that of the Photuris,
where the authentic odor of the female bee is itself a signal evolved for the very purpose
of advertising the female’s presence, with a teleosemanticist-certified meaning such
as “female here”. Now the orchid mimics this odor. Artiga’s approach classifies the
mimicry as deception. (The folk intuition agrees; so do I.)
(2) Take one step to the right, and we find (or at least might find) a case where
the female odor is selected and maintained for reasons other than attracting males—
for repelling predators, say. The odor is picked up by the males to track the females,
73

and now mimicked by the orchid to attract the males. It is already unclear what the
teleosemanticist should say about this case. In order for Artiga’s approach to classify
the orchid’s odor as deceptive, it needs to mean “female here”, but this meaning
could not have been copied from the female’s own odor, for if the female’s own odor
means anything it could only be “leave me alone” to the predator. Artiga’s approach
must therefore classify this case as non-deception. But if so, the difference between
deception and non-deception hinges on whether the authentic signal has the function
of eliciting the same response that the fake signal has the function of eliciting. If it
does, there is deception; if not (as in the present case), not. We will see shortly that if
we are to cut the continuum at a single place, this is not the place. But let’s move on.
(3) Further to the right, we may find cases where the male finds the female not
by her odor but by the shape of her body, and it is accordingly this shape that the
orchid mimics. (Schiestl reports that sexual deception is chiefly through odor, but a
hypothetical case would make my point just as well.) Suppose also that this particular
shape has no evolutionary function, but is a by-product (a spandrel, as Stephen Jay
Gould calls it) of highly stable traits without which the female could not survive;
perhaps a particular bodily symmetry. Most teleosemanticists (except the revisionists)
would balk at ascribing meaning to this shape. Artiga too would classify this case
as non-deception, since the shape that occurs on the female body does not have the
meaning “female here” for the orchid’s shape to inherit, without which the orchid’s
shape is not false. But I suggest that this case is more different from case (2) than
case (2) is different from case (1). As I described it, the bee’s shape is almost immune
to evolutionary change, whereas the odors in the first two cases are decidedly less
stable. The mate-attracting odor may be selected against if it attracts predators; the
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predator-repelling odor may be lost if the predators go extinct, etc. Over evolutionary
times we should see the orchids that mimic this shape survive more vicissitudes than
those that mimic odors.
Finally, at the far right end—and we are leaving the orchids and returning to the
owl—there is the case where what is mimicked is a condition of the non-biological
world, such as silence, whose features are not subject to evolution at all. Even this case
is not necessarily too far from the left end to be called “deception” in some theoretically
useful sense (see next section). But the main grounds for being dissatisfied with
Artiga’s approach are the cases in the middle.

Let’s take stock. All but two expert witnesses I called convict the owl of deception
(though I rather doubt that they expected this result). The two exceptions are the
orthodox teleosemantics, the standard version, and the orthodox teleosemantics,
Artiga’s version—both combined with (R), the claim that deception is done via false
signals. The standard version acquits both the owl and the Photuris, but there is good
reason to consider this witness discredited. Artiga’s version convicts the owl and
acquits the Photuris, but only by cutting a continuum at a point with no obvious
explanatory significance.
On reflection, perhaps you will not find it too hard to accept that the owl is indeed
a deceiver. Just as the octopus is a master of visual camouflage, the owl is a master
of auditory camouflage. Is camouflage not deceptive? But again this is a gut feeling;
the modelist looks at explanatorily relevant features. Now I will make a modelist
proposal to put all the frauds in their rightful places.
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3.3 A Continuum of Frauds
Figure 3.6 is a somewhat modified version of 3.2 and describes a signaling system at
equilibrium. This is the diagram on which the most important explanatory differences
can be located. There is a receiver/victim, who is interested in doing A when state
S obtains and doing A0 otherwise. Unable to directly observe S, she has evolved or
learned to observe a proxy, M, which is sufficiently correlated with S. (M 0 is what the
receiver observes when she does not observe M.) But a deceiver, D, has evolved or
learned to also cause M, and so the receiver sometimes does A0 in the absence of S.
(N, for “neither”, is the absence of both S and D. I assume for simplicity that D and S
are never both present.)
S
M

A
receiver

D
M0

A0

N

Figure 3.6. “Neither” is the absence of both mates and predators. Dashed
lines represent the stabilizing force.

What sets deception apart from other cases of signaling—the essential features
that cry out for explanation in a case like the Photuris—seems to me to be this: the
M–A correlation is being exploited by some organism which implements D–M, to
the detriment of the receiver, and yet the receiver is sticking to M–A. This raises the
question, Why does the receiver not break M–A?
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This explanatory project presupposes two things, without either of which it would
not be quite as interesting or demanding: first, D–M is implemented by some organism
(i.e., evolved or learned; below I will only focus on the evolutionary case) as opposed
to naturally occurring; and second, M–A is breakable.
If D–M is naturally occurring, then even if it gets in the receiver’s way it is still
just a confounding factor. A fire that attracts moths is an example of this; a streak of
unusually warm days in early spring is another (think of D as the time of the year
and M as temperature). These cases do not call for the same kind of explanation as
does the firefly system and so, from the modelist point of view, does not deserve the
same label. To be sure, even here one may say that the moth is “fooled”, or that the
plants are “tricked” into flowering too early, without sounding jarring, but the degree
of anthropomorphism is obvious. (It may be worth noting that Stegmann and Cao
seem committed to classifying these as genuine deception.) Another qualification:
the distinction between being implemented and naturally occurring is not meant
to be a sharp one. A fire kept burning for hundreds of years by the bodies of all the
moths that died in it would be a mildly plausible case in between. This long-living fire
would have acquired the etiological function of causing moths to orient themselves
by reference to it—for that is what explains its continued existence—and would thus
be convicted of deception by at least Artiga and Paternotte.
The breakability of M–A (a matter of degree, obviously) is also quite important.
If M–A is highly unbreakable—if, say, it is a constraint imposed by the receiver’s
metabolism, which she has no easy way to evolve out of—then the system would
again be deprived of much of the dynamics that characterizes the firefly system. The
deceiver would be able to exploit to its heart’s content, unchecked by frequency77

dependent selection, and the receiver would have to keep obliging until she evolved a
different metabolism or went extinct. By contrast, the male Photinus can fight back by
weakening M–A more easily and earlier, as soon as the relative frequency of impostors
exceeds a certain threshold. (However, intuitively central cases of deception with
highly unbreakable M–A are conceivable, and perhaps actually exist, even though
they are dynamically crippled. The young cuckoo begs its foster parents for food in
such exaggerated ways that, some writers suggest, the foster parents are just not in a
position to resist (Krebs and Dawkins 1984, Dawkins 1982, citing Lack 1968). If this
is because any weakening in the begging–feeding correlation would endanger the
foster parents’ own chicks too much, then this would be a case of highly unbreakable
M–A, but also, intuitively, the young cuckoo is engaged in deception.)
The third important correlation is S–M, and here we come to the major difference
between the Photuris and the owl, and this is also where the (partial) continuum
sketched in the previous section is located. Intuitively the most central case is where
S–M is not only evolved, but evolved as a signaling system for the very purpose of
eliciting A from the receiver, and afterwards (or almost simultaneously) a deceiver
evolves to exploit it. The Photuris is such a deceiver: it exploits a system that evolved
among the Photinus for eliciting males’ approach, and that is the very response the
Photuris now tries to elicit. The great tit, which sometimes gives false alarm calls to
scare away competitors for food (Møller 1988, cited in Maynard-Smith and Harper
2003), is another example. The tit exploits the alarm system for eliciting the same
response (fleeing) for which the system was originally evolved to elicit. The sender
(the honest one) and the receiver in the exploited system need not share substantially
common interests in order for exploitation to occur. There needs to be just enough
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common interest to maintain an exploitable system. Contest display provides many
examples of this sort. Mantis shrimps, for instance (Adams and Caldwell 1990), show
off their raptorial claws when contesting a burrow—which researchers interpret as
signaling their fighting abilities—and the contestant with the smaller claw usually
does the best thing for both parties by retreating without an actual fight. This system
is exploited by molting and newly molted shrimps which, though they would almost
certainly lose an actual fight against an intermolt opponent, display their useless but
normal-looking claws anyway and sometimes successfully bluff away their opponents.
Somewhat less paradigmatic are the cases where S–M is evolved for a purpose
other than eliciting the A from the receiver, but M–A evolves to be a reliable correlation nonetheless. The receiver is merely eavesdropping, or following cues that
are not “meant” for it. The deceiver, of course, does not care for what purpose an
exploitable correlation is evolved, and exploits it anyway. Some cases of mimicry fall
into this category. Above I described the hypothetical cases of orchids mimicking
the odor and shape of female bees in order to attract male bees, where the female
bees’ own odor and shape are not evolved for attracting males, but for the purpose
of, say, repelling predators, or enabling the females to fly. For a real case, look no
further than the blue jay, which is well-known for mimicking the calls of local hawks
to scare away birds that are competing with the jay for food, though the hawk’s own
calls are certainly not evolved for the purpose of scaring away its preys. For another
infamous example, the angler fish exploits the correlation between worms and wiggling objects, a correlation which is surely not evolved for attracting the angler fish’s
prey. Those cases of camouflage where one organism resembles another (as opposed
to resembling non-living things) may also fall into this categories. Leaf insects (of
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the family Phylliidae) exploit the correlation between “there is a leaf here” and “there
is a leaf-like object here” to avoid predation, though leaves certainly did not evolve to
look the way they do in order to avoid the predators of leaf insects.
Deception of this kind is a particularly hard case for teleosemanticists. In every
case of deception the teleosemanticist faces the problem that, given the opposed
interests between the deceiver and the receiver, it is hard to attribute content to the
deceptive signal. This problem may be solved by an appeal to biological kinds—by
saying, as Artiga (2014) does, that the deceptive signal is of the same kind as the
authentic signal and therefore inherits the content of the latter. In a case like that of the
blue jay, however, there is the additional problem that the authentic signal (the hawk’s
call) is not evolved to elicit the response that the deceptive signal (the blue jay’s fake
call) is evolved to elicit, and thus it is hard to see how the teleosemanticist could even
attribute content to the authentic signal, let alone attributing the same content to both
signals. An appeal to biological kind would not help. But it is not plausible to deny
that the blue jay is engaged in deception, either—and not just because as philosophers
we are reluctant to declare biologists wrong in applying biological concepts, but
because drawing a dramatic line with the Photuris on one side and the blue jay on the
other fails to cut a dynamic world at its dynamic joints. The only difference between
the system involving the blue jay and the system involving the Photuris lies in whether
the correlation being exploited, S–M, was selected for complementing M–A, or for
some other purpose. While this difference is not trivial, it has no inherent relevance
for the dynamics of these systems. Neither evolutionary trajectory is inherently more
likely to establish the S–A correlation, inherently more inviting to exploitation, or
inherently more prone to collapse when exploited.
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Put another way, if all we know is that in one system there exists an exploitable
correlation established in one way, and in another system a similarly exploitable
correlation established in another way, we can predict some commonality—namely,
that these correlations may be exploited and consequently undermined—but there
will be little predictable difference. If we call the exploiter in one of the systems a
“deceiver”, I see no justification for not calling the exploiter in other system the same.
Is D–M evolved?

Yes

No

Is M–A breakable?

fire attracting
moths

Yes

No

Is S–M evolved?

cuckoo begging

Yes

No

How stable is S–M?

owl

Not very

Very

Photuris, blue jay

green-plant mimickers

Figure 3.7

Moving on, we locate the owl as the least central among the more central cases,
where S–M is not evolved but a fixture in the environment. But M–A is breakable
(since the mouse can easily choose to be more vigilant even when all is quiet), making
the owl more similar to the Photuris than the young cuckoo is: see Figure 3.7. Also in
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this category are all cases of camouflage where the camouflaged animal resembles,
not another organism, but a non-living object. Systems involving these deceivers
are likely to be more stable than systems involving paradigmatic deceivers, since in
this case S–M is unshakable by evolution. Where S is a condition of the non-living
world it may also be more prevalent than the doings of any living thing, which means
that S–M will always be pretty strong: silence will always be a good sign that no owl
is around (there will never be enough owls to undermine this), and a white mass
is always more likely to be snow than an arctic fox. Perhaps the resilience of the S–
M correlation is why we are reluctant to consider the owl a deceiver. Nevertheless,
resilience is a matter of degree, and the kind of cases where S–M does not evolve at all
are continuous with the kind of cases where S–M may change only a little (think of
animals that try to look like plants by being green: plants being green hasn’t changed
since there were plants), which are continuous with the kind of cases where S–M
changes easily and frequently.
Figure 3.7 is a tree of all the more or less deceptive cases, grouped by similarity in
dynamics. (I have not said anything about the other two correlations in Figure 3.6
because they are not important. N–M 0 is the condition where nothing interesting
happens, and M 0 –A0 is how the receiver kills her time in that condition.)
Whether we call the owl a deceiver is ultimately unimportant, a verbal decision
of no real consequence. The owl’s place in the continuum of frauds is what matters.
But if we do classify the begging cuckoo as a deceiver, then we should classify the
owl as such, too, if only for consistency. If the owl does not seem to the folk to have
committed deceptive representation—representing itself as absent, or whatever—I
say at least it has committed deceptive para-representation, which is just like deceptive
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representation from an explanatory point of view, but somehow not regarded by the
folk as such. The prosecution now rests its case.

3.4 A Continuum of Fraud with Honesty
One thing the case of the owl did is to challenge the claim (R), which I state again:
(R)

Deception is done via signals with false contents.

But strictly speaking the owl’s case only challenged the combination of (R) with
orthodox teleosemantics. Here is a more direct challenge.
Consider this hypothetical scenario. The senders are male and the receivers female.
Males always prefer to mate. Females prefer to mate with males of high quality, but
would rather mate with a low-quality male than not mating at all. High-quality males
always send a signal that dramatically increases their visibility. Low-quality males
sometimes send the same signal, sometimes not; in the latter case their chance of
finding a female is much lower. Since a signal always raises the probability that its
sender is high-quality, mating with the sender is always the better choice for the
female (assuming that she has no other way to assess male quality). Because if the
female foregoes the opportunity, she will either meet another signaling male later
and face the same choice again—this will be the best-case scenario, and she will be
no better off than if she had mated with the previous signaling male—or she will
only run into non-signaling, guaranteed-low-quality males, or, worse still, not find
another male at all. Also assume for simplicity that a female can mate only once every
season (there is no restriction on males). Thus mating with a low-quality male does
not merely reduce her chance of mating with a high-quality one, but eliminates it.
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When a female is induced to mate with a low-quality signaling male, is she
deceived?
There are two variations to consider. Variation 1: High-quality males are abundant
in absolute numbers. A female is almost guaranteed to meet one before the mating
season ends. In this case, if a female has the misfortune of meeting a low-quality
signaling male first and decides to mate with him, then despite her decision being
strategically sound she is, intuitively and in the books of most biologists, a clear
victim of deception. She is duped by the impostor out of her otherwise good chance
of mating with a high-quality male. If we drop the simplifying assumption that the
female can mate only once per season, she will not outright lose the opportunity of
mating with a high-quality male. But she will still be a textbook victim of deception.
Her loss of the opportunity to mate with one more high-quality male is still a loss
caused by misleading advertisement.
Most of my expert witnesses would probably agree. This case fits Skyrms’s theory
(the signal raises the probability of the non-actual state that the sender is high-quality,
to the apparent detriment of the receiver). It also fits Artiga and Patternotte’s (in
addition to helping females locate the sender, the low-quality male’s signal also has
the function of causing the female to “think” that the sender is high-quality, though
he is not). McWhirter would ask whether the impostor is misusing the signal—using
it in an atypical way. The answer is yes if we suppose impostors to be the minority
among signaling males. (Even when impostors outnumber the real high-quality
senders and become the more typical senders themselves, I think most people would
still judge the female to be a victim of deception, provided her chance of mating with
a high-quality male, now ruined by the impostor, was originally a reasonably good
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one. If this intuition is worth anything, it counts against McWhirter’s theory.)
Now consider Variation 2, where the relative frequencies of high- versus lowquality males are the same as before, but males of any quality are rare in absolute
numbers, and high-quality ones are rarer still. The chance of a female meeting a
high-quality male is extremely low: she would be lucky to spot a low-quality one. In
this case, even a low-quality sender seems to be doing females a favor by advertising
himself, and the encounter between him and a female would seem more like a gain
for the latter—considering the very real possibility of not finding a mate at all—
rather than a loss of a remote chance of mating with a high-quality male. Instead
of seeing the signal from a low-quality male as proclaiming falsely “high-quality
male here”, it is more plausible to see it as proclaiming, truly, “male here”. This is not
just my own intuition. Imagine a biologist looking at a mating signal that seems to
be selected primarily for its coordinating effect. If the signal happens to be slightly
correlated with high male quality, would he describe the case as one of low-quality
males masquerading as high-quality, just because of that? He would probably describe
it as a case of low-quality males being worse at announcing their presence. It is not the
females, but the low-quality non-signaling males that deserve sympathy.
The two variations are the two extremes. Between them there is space for a
continuous variation in male abundance, and with that a continuous variation in
how much a female seems to gain or lose by mating with a low-quality signaling
male. The easier it is for the female to find a high-quality male, the more she seems
to lose; the harder it is for her to find any male at all, the more she seems to gain. The
signal seems more deceptive towards one end and more honest towards the other. Yet
the content of the signal, if it has one, must stay the same across all the variations, it
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seems. For what could possibly change it? The relative frequencies of the male types
are fixed, the payoff of mating with either type is fixed, and it is established that the
female’s best strategy in all circumstances is to mate with the first signaling male she
finds. The only change is that the numbers of the two types of males are scaled by a
common factor. Surely, it seems, the content of a signal could not possibly depend
on this.
In other words, we seem to have an inconsistent triad:
(D)

The deceptiveness of the signal varies continuously with male abundance.

(C)

The content of the signal does not vary with male abundance.

(S)

The deceptiveness of a signal supervenes on its content.

(D) is hard to reject. If we cannot reject (C), then (S) must go, and since (S) is implied
by (R), (R) must go.
Some may want to reject (C). Shea et al. (2017) probably will, given their view
on content. They hold that the content of a signal—its functional content, as they
call it—is the state (if any) whose co-occurrence with the signal contributed to the
stabilization of the whole system. Now it may be that the signal in the continuum I
described is stabilized differently at different points: primarily by its co-occurrence
with high-quality males when males are abundant, and primarily by its co-occurrence
with males, any males, when males are sparse. This suggestion is hard to evaluate
because Shea et al.’s notion of contribution is not mathematically defined. But suppose
it is true. Then Shea et al. can say that the signal is true in Variation 2 and false in
Variation 1.
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However, this does not solve the problem, because as Shea et al. define it, the
content of a signal necessarily is (and is designed to be) propositional. What stabilizes
the whole system is the signal’s co-occurrence with some state or other in its entirety,
so to speak. There is no such thing as a signal co-occurring with 30% of a state. There
are only two stabilizing states in the mating scenario: either there is a high-quality
male, or there is thankfully at least a male. So the content of the mating signal must
be either “high-quality male” or just “male”; there is no possibility of anything in
between. This discontinuity is exactly what Shea et al. want, but it creates another
inconsistency:
(D)

The deceptiveness of the signal varies continuously with male abundance.

(P)

The content of the signal does not vary continuously with male abundance.

(S)

The deceptiveness of a signal supervenes on its content.
Put another way, if we hold on to (S), then given (D), the content of the signal must

vary continuously between “(just) male” and “high-quality male”; in other words, it
must not be propositional. So, not only Shea et al., but any theory that defines content
in propositional forms (such as Birch 2014, and any theory of content from the 1980s
and 90s) will inevitably produce inconsistency. Are all those theories refuted just
like this? Of course not. Rather I take the moral to be that we should reject (S), and
consequently (R). Propositional contents may be intuitively compelling, but they do
not characterize deception well, for which this continuum from fraud to honesty is
another piece of evidence. And it is not as if there were no alternative. The sender–
deceiver–receiver model sketched in the previous section seems quite enough. It
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describes what everyone is doing and explains why they are doing it. As Lewis might
have remarked, nothing important seems to have been left unsaid.

This chapter is a complement to the first. In the first chapter I focused on systems
that are fully cooperative. Some of them are simple machines for which the word
“cooperative” may seem overpraise, but at least their parts are not scheming to destroy
each other. I argued that representation is floating free from explanatory relevant
facts in those systems. This chapter has looked at systems involving varying degrees of
antagonism, and the moral is similar. The explanatory continuity between cases like
the owl and the Photuris, and between the two variations discussed in the last section,
is much stronger than their representational appearances would suggest. It is also
richer than the single-dimensional idea of content could adequately characterize.
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4
Explaining Success, and Other Concerns
I’m out of pebbles for now. It is Goliath’s turn to strike back. I foresee attacks from
two directions.
Descriptive adequacy. I claimed that sender–receiver models do not leave out
anything relevant to a system’s representational credential. This seems true
enough of the lantern system. But some may suspect it is not true in general.
Here an important claim to consider is that representational systems are robust
in a way that non-representational systems are not.
Explanatory completeness. Following Lewis, I claimed that sender–receiver
models leave out nothing explanatorily relevant—at the level where the question
is why Revere, the sexton, the Photinus, and so on adopt the signaling strategies
they adopt, not why Revere can count or why the Photinus can flash. This is
the level where representation should play a role if it has a role to play. I argued
that it has no role to play. If cast in a role anyway (by (R), say), it performs
poorly. But some may say that I overlooked some roles: perhaps a structuring
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role, as Dretske argues; or a role in explaining success.1
I shall reply to these claims, albeit in a rather cursory manner. A full treatment will
require several dissertations in their own right. Sections 4.1 and 4.3, in particular, are
only meant to indicate the general strategies I think modelists should use.

4.1 Are Representational Systems Robust®?
Some philosophers claim that representational systems are robust in a way that nonrepresentational systems are not. Among them Burge (2010) and Shea (unpublished)
stand out, for placing great theoretical weight on this idea.
Exactly what this idea amounts to is not clear. In a weak and vague but frequently
used sense, robustness is some sort of invariance in a system’s output despite variations
in its input. In this sense nature is abound with robust systems: this ball, which will
stop at the bottom of this pit wherever I release it; that spring, which will bounce
back to its natural length however you compress it. The Watt governor and the
voltage regulator from Chapter 1 are robust. Even natural selection can be robust
(witness convergent evolution and the 1:1 sex ratio). But no one dreams of baking
representational pies out of these materials.
People like Burge and Shea must have a more restrictive, member-exclusive kind
of robustness in mind. I will call it robustness®. The nature of robustness® is often
only explained demonstratively, by pointing to examples which are allegedly robust®,
1 Explanatory completeness is of course not independent from descriptive adequacy; the former implies

the latter, and if a model is not descriptively adequate then it cannot be explanatorily complete. But
I am basing my classification on the direction of coming attacks, not on the damage they will do if
successful.
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but they are generally not very forthcoming about what exactly constitutes their
robustness®. In what way is the visual system robust® but convergent evolution merely
robust? The visual system adjusts for distance to maintain a constant perception of
size, but evolution also adjusts for genetic distance to ensure a constant anteater-look
in the giant anteater and the aardvark.
Shea has a somewhat more elaborate account. According to him, robustness®
(unlike plebeian robustness, I take it) is maintained by a system’s internal, environment-tracking components. Balls and springs are out for lack of appropriate
components. While it is still rather uncertain how high the bar is—I wonder what
Shea would say about convergent evolution, for one thing—Shea has a model of
robustness®. He imagines a trolley which moves along a straight track. It reliably
goes to a point T and stops there, wherever its starting point. Shea describes its
mechanism:
S [the trolley] has an internal register r that correlates with its distance
from the origin, and another internal register a that correlates with
the velocity of its wheels. A third internal state δ correlates with the
distance of the system from T. That correlation is achieved by subtracting
the activity of r from another fixed level of activity t. A monotonic
transformation from this difference signal δ to a is such that the motion
produced in the wheels drives S from any starting position to T, where
it stops. (Shea unpublished, p. 67)
Shea claims that the trolley is a representational system and is robust®, if not quite
the best exemplar: “The robustness[®] is not very great, and so representational
explanation will not deliver very much additional explanatory purchase, but the case
is sufficient to illustrate the point” (ibid).
My modelist response is to wonder whether Shea’s trolley has doppelgängers. The
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Watt governor seems to come close. Let the vertical position of the swinging balls be
the register r, correlated with engine output; and let the aperture size of the throttle
valve be the register a, correlated with the inflow of steam. The internal state δ is the
distance between the actual vertical position of the balls from where they should be
(t); δ is transformed to a (whether it is monotonic depends on the actual design).
Take this system out of equilibrium, and it reliably goes back. It seems robust®, no?
In any case, a new toy will be more satisfying. We build it as follows. Take a
trolley—a regular one with no hidden gadgets. Take two rubber bands, which I
shall name Romeo and Tango. Tie Romeo to the left end of the trolley and the left
end of the track (we may need a very long band). Tie Tango to the right end of the
trolley and the right end of the track. Adjust the lengths of Romeo and Tango so
their tensions balance out at the desired point, T. Now this rubber-powered trolley
will behave more or less like Shea’s. If you take it to any place other than T, the more
stretched rubber band will pull it toward T until it stops there. (It may do quite a bit
of overshooting and undershooting before coming to a complete stop, but this can be
remedied with less slick wheels.) It also has the right kind of components—internals
ones, too, if you take an extended view of the trolley to include the rubber-bands.
Romeo (or Tango) is the register r whose length correlates with the trolley’s distance
from the origin (wherever we deem it to be). The difference in length between Romeo
and Tango is the internal state δ , which correlates with the trolley’s distance from T
(and δ = t – r, where t is the fixed distance of T from the origin, wherever it is). The
rubber takes care of mapping δ to the trolley’s acceleration, and then to its velocity.
The rubber-powered trolley seems to me about as robust® as Shea’s. The correspondence is admittedly not prefect—for example, in the rubber-band trolley the mapping
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from acceleration to velocity is not monotonic (which results in overshoot)—but
surely robustness® could not depend on such insignificant details. Yet I suppose that
the rubber-band trolley does not look like a representational system to you. Nor
will its working tempt anyone to concoct even a remotely representational explanation. Any kind of robustness possessed by the rubber-powered trolley is therefore by
definition not the member-exclusive robustness®.
If robustness® exists, it still remains unknown.

4.2 Can Representational Contents Cause Behavior?
This question is obviously worth a dissertation on its own. Here I will only discuss
Dretske’s argument that contents are indeed causally efficacious. Not only is it highly
influential, Dretske’s view also stands out from its rivals for being (for lack of a
better phrase) metaphysically lightweight. It involves no appeal to supervenience,
causal surrogates (e.g. Crane and Mellor 1990), or any such heavyweight notion
which strikes me, rightly or wrongly, as motivated by little more than a desire to save
contents from irrelevance. Dretske brings no such baggage. Nevertheless, I think his
argument fails.
The locus classicus is Dretske (1988), which presents the learning jay as a paradigm
of contents’ causal efficacy. I discussed the jay in Chapter 1 for a different purpose.
For diversity, here I consider an evolutionary example, from Dretske (1995). Scarlet
Gilia is a plant that changes its color from red to white in mid-July. Figure 4.1 is
Dretske’s diagram of this color-changing process. In order to change color at the right
time, there must be some internal state of the plant, an indicator, C, which occurs
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exactly when the right external condition F (mid-July) obtains, and which triggers
some other internal mechanism in the plant, causing the effect E (the change of color).
Now Dretske concedes that contents have no role in explaining C’s causing E; how C
causes E is a question better left to the chemist. But there is another question: How
come the plant has this mechanism, C→E? Or as Dretske puts it, why was C, rather
than some other state or none at all, “recruited” to be the cause of E? The answer
is not to be found in chemistry, but in evolutionary history. First there must have
been plants with tokens of C, not yet wired to be a cause of E. Then an accidental
wiring of C→E occurred in some mutant and proved to have a selective advantage.
Perhaps it attracted pollinators: before mid-July the main pollinator was the redloving hummingbird, and afterwards it was the white-loving hawkmoth. Or perhaps
it repelled red-hating and white-hating predators that arose at different times of the
year. Whatever its advantage, C→E spread, and although an individual plant was
either born with it or born without it, on a population level it looked as if C was
gradually recruited to be the cause of E with increasing efficacy. Content, Dretske
says, must have a role in this process—a causal role no less. It is C’s representing F
that caused C to be recruited to be the cause of E. A cause that causes another causal
mechanism to be put in place is a structuring cause. Contents, Dretske claims, can
act as structuring causes.
I think Dretske is mistaken. Consider the question: when did the structuring
process, the process of wiring C to be the cause of E, begin? Did it begin when the first
mutant plant with C appeared, when C was neither wired to E nor representing F?
Arguably the process had already begun then: it was only waiting. Another mutation
to wire C to E, and it would go into full swing. But suppose that waiting period did
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not count. The next landmark is when the second mutation occurred—when the first
mutant with the complete C→E did appear. Then the structuring process definitely
did begin. This mutant now had a selective advantage, its kind was now starting
to spread, and this spreading was the very process whereby (speaking of the whole
population) C was increasingly wired to be the cause of E. But did C represent F at this
early stage, where there were only a few plants with C→E? For any teleosemanticist
committed to a backward-looking theory of function—and this includes Dretske—
the answer must be no. Only signal tokens with a right kind of history behind them
can have functions and thereby have contents. The very early indicators did not
have that kind of history: they were essentially swamp indicators, yet to prove their
evolutionary worth. Even by Dretske’s own lights they could not have had contents
(or functions, for that matter). But the structuring process had already been up and
running back then. Whatever cause was driving the process back then, it could not
have been C’s content now. Contents are simply too late to the party.
Could contents have joined the party half way, so as to play at least some role in
the structuring process? This is a completely ad hoc suggestion. If the structuring
process has been running properly long before C acquires its content, why should it
need help later? What difference can the addition of contents make?
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What did act as the structuring cause was, of course, the correlation of C with
F. Had C not been correlated with F, C→E would not have prevailed. Since C was
correlated with F, C→E prevailed with no need for further assistance.
As further evidence for the irrelevance of content, notice that when giving a causal
explanation of C being wired to E, there is no need to mention content. Once we
have said that C was correlated F, and that a mechanism for producing E would be
selected if it could render E correlated with F, we will have said all that needs to be
said, in outline; the rest is filling out the details. At no point do we have to mention
“C represents F”. It would be odd for a causally relevant fact to be so omittable in a
complete causal explanation.
It might be objected on Dretske’s behalf that the lack of a need to “mention” is
neither here nor there. A complete causal story of why water boils need not mention
heat: it can (in principle) be told in the language of molecules. We do not for that
reason dismiss heat as causally irrelevant. Why treat content worse?
The answer is that content is indeed in a worse position. Mentioning molecular
kinetic energy is mentioning heat, because that’s what heat is; the use of the word
“heat” is not essential. Mentioning correlations, selective advantages, and so on is not
a way to mention content, however, because content is not any of these things or all of
them taken together. Content, at least according to Dretske himself, needs one more
ingredient: actual history. To repeat a point made earlier, in the beginning there was
no content. “In the beginning there was information”,2 and natural selection and all
the other necessary ingredients to get the structuring process up and running. Those
ingredients need to be mentioned to explain how the structuring process started,
2 As Dretske (1981, p. vii) memorably said.
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what it was doing, what its future held—and its future is where representational
contents would have to be found, if they would be found at all. Since these ingredients
necessarily precede content, mentioning them is not an oblique way of mentioning
content. In fact, adding content to the list would positively poison the explanation
with that peculiar kind of vacuity that results from attempting to causally explain a
process by its consequence (“What makes marriage last?” “The 40th anniversary.”).
There are moments when Dretske seems almost to concede the point, giving
credit to “the causal efficacy of information” rather than representation (as evidenced
by the phrase just quoted, from Dretske 2000, p. 207). Here is another instance, in
his reply to Baker (1991):
To attribute meaning to a token internal state is, on this account of
meaning (and belief), to describe the source of its causal efficacy. It is to
say what gave it a voice in the determination of output, what led to its
installation as a control structure.…It is to say that C acquired causal
efficacy (the sort of efficacy relevant to shaping output) from earlier
tokens of this type indicating (carrying the information) F. (Dretske 1991,
p. 116, symbols changed for consistency with the current discussion.)
Here not only does Dretske claim (correctly) that the efficacy of current C tokens
is a result of past C tokens indicating—rather than representing—F, but also, in a
departure from his official position, relegates content to the status of a shorthand:
“current C tokens mean F” is merely short for “current C tokens have their causal role
as a result of past C tokens indicating F”. If this is what “C means F” amounts to, then
contents are not structuring causes; correlations are. I agree.
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4.3 Do Contents Explain Success?
Some philosophers will not be greatly disturbed by causal irrelevance. They maintain
that representational contents are still relevant, though perhaps in a non-causal way,
in explaining why successful actions are successful. This is usually illustrated by
beer-finding. Brett wants beer—so a typical story goes—and he believes there is beer
in the fridge, so he goes to the kitchen, opens the fridge, and lo and behold, there is
beer. Why does Brett succeed in finding beer? According to these philosophers, of
which Papineau (1993) is a representative, the answer must have the following shape:
X desires G.
X believes, of some behavior, that it will produce G.
This belief is true.

X achieves G.

(Papineau 1993, p. 69)

The third line is the crucial one. Contents get a mention in the first and the second
line too, but are not given real roles there. We can rewrite those two lines to refer
only to representational vehicles—“Two internal states of X, D and B, together cause
some behavior”, etc.—and the explanation will be just as good. But the reference to
truth in the third line implicates content ineliminably. A contentless vehicle cannot
be true. Papineau claims that the involvement of truth is essential.
I suggest there is a truth-free alternative: we simply note the co-occurrence of a
behavior and the condition in which the behavior will succeed:
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X desires G.
X has a belief, which when combined with X’s desire for G will cause
behavior H.
H will produce G.

X achieves G.
The reference to truth is gone. While we are at it, the belief and desire referred to
in the second line can also be easily purged, replaced by internal states (vehicles) B
and D, which are identified by their physical properties. When X’s belief and desire
combine to cause an action, it is in fact the partnership of B and D that is doing the
work.
The content of the desire in the first line is harder to get rid of. It is doing the
crucial job of setting success conditions. Finding beer counts as a success for Brett
because he desires beer. It would have been a failure had he desired sobriety. It is not
immediately clear how to phase out this content without losing success conditions.3
But since the present question concerns only the explanatory role of truth—and thus
only the contents of beliefs—I will simply take success conditions for granted.
Putting the pieces together, here is my schema in full, truth-free and content-free
(except what might be implicated in D’s setting the success conditions):
X has an internal state D, which sets the success conditions, G, for X’s
behavior.
X also has an internal state B, which when combined with D will cause
3 Some discussions:

Papineau op. cit., Dokic and Engel (2003) and Blackburn (2012).
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behavior H.
H will produce G.

X achieves success.
To put the point more succinctly: while for Papineau success is to be explained
by “the combination of (a) having a belief with a specific truth condition and (b)
the fact that makes this belief true” (personal communication), I say that success
is to be explained by the combination of (a) having an internal state that (possibly
in conjunction with other states) causes a behavior and (b) the occurrence of the
condition in which the said behavior will succeed. My explanation is not necessarily
better, and it need not be. It just needs to be as good. If a truth-free explanation of
success is just as good as a truth-laden one, then truth is explanatorily superfluous.
Papineau objects (personal communication) that my truth-free schema misses
a general explanatory pattern. What if Brett’s success is not limited to his quest for
beer? He listens to weather forecast and manages to stay dry; he asks Google about
traffic and manages to spend as little time as possible in airports without missing
a flight. Each success will have its own explanation. But Papineau’s schema has an
invariant third line, “His belief is true”, enabling the generalization that all of Brett’s
success is the result of having true beliefs. With my schema this generalization is
broken up and scattered in each instance, no longer visible. Instead of saying that
Brett’s belief (in the proposition that p, for some p) is true, the third line will just be
p—a different p in each case: “Carrying an umbrella will keep Brett dry”, “Leaving
at 7:30 will enable Brett to catch the flight with minimum waiting at the gate”, etc.
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Though each of these explanations may be adequate on its own, taken together they
are not as illuminating.
I reply that the alleged generality is an illusion, created by the indexical “this”.
Brett’s success is not due to a single belief; he is helped by a different “this belief ” on
each occasion. As soon as we demand “this belief ” be cashed out, we get a series of
The belief that carrying an umbrella will keep him dry is true.
The belief that leaving at 7:30 will minimize waiting at the gate is true.
..
.
Truth is still common currency in this series, but it can be made to disappear by
disquotation, for as far as explanatory power goes, to say that p is true is to say no
more than p. Thus:
Carrying an umbrella will keep him dry.
Leaving at 7:30 will minimize waiting at the gate.
..
.
And these are exactly identical to the third lines in my schema. Unless disquotation
can reduce explanatory power, Papineau’s schema must have no more explanatory
power than mine. But even an inflationist about truth would have a hard time
maintaining that disquotation has this almost magical power. If disquotation can
reduce explanatory power, shouldn’t re-quotation be able to increase it? But had
Sherlock Holmes explained it thus, “He has just come from the tropics, for ‘his face is
dark’ is true, and ‘that is not the natural tint of his skin’ is true, for ‘his wrists are fair’
is true”, I doubt that Dr. Watson would have been more enlightened.
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My schema above isn’t quite right yet. As Gamester (2018) recently argues, normal
success ought to be distinguished from coincidental success. Brett’s success in finding
beer is a normal one. Squee’s is not: Squee believes there is beer in his fridge, but in
fact there isn’t. However, an explosion at a nearby grocery sent a pack flying, landing
right in front of the fridge as he stepped into the kitchen. Driven by a false belief,
Squee finds beer (never mind the shattered windows). Squee’s success either cannot
be explained—perhaps coincidences are by nature inexplicable—or at least needs
to be explained in a different way than Brett’s success. But my schema, as it is, is
applicable to both cases:
Brett/ Squee has an internal state D, given which his success consists in
finding beer.
He has another internal state B which, when combined with D, causes
him to go to the kitchen.
His going to the kitchen will result in his finding beer.

Brett / Squee finds beer.
As Gamester would urge, this cannot be right.4 By contrast, a schema like Papineau’s
is not blind to the difference. It applies to Brett but by the crucial third line, “His
belief is true”, excludes Squee.
Gamester is right that the two kinds of success need to be explained differently; my
schema is too inclusive as it is. But the fix is simple: just append “non-coincidentally”
4 Gamester’s argument is not actually directed to my schema, but to a more elaborate schema which he

imputes to deflationists. But his point is a general one and applies to my schema just as well.
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or, perhaps more naturally, “in the normal course of things”, to the end of the third
line. (Gamester thinks that the problem can only be fixed by involving truth; I think
he is wrong.) The following is the amended schema, in its final form:
X has an internal state D, which sets the success conditions, G, for X’s
behavior.
X has another internal state B which, when combined with D, causes
behavior H.
H will produce G in the normal course of things.

X achieves success.
It is true that Brett’s going to the kitchen will result in his finding beer in the normal
course of things. It is not true that Squee’s going to the kitchen will result in his
finding beer in the normal course of things. Squee is thus excluded. (In case you
wonder whether truth is being smuggled in through the backdoor, it is not. The third
line is now equivalent to this: that the state B occurs in conditions where behavior
caused by B and D will be successful in the normal course of things. This is far from
saying that B is true: it does not even say that B will contribute to success when paired
with partners other than D.)

Let’s now move beyond Brett and Squee, and take a wider view. If truth is relevant
within an individual, it should be relevant in a joint venture, too. Consider again the
lantern system. When the British come by land, the sexton hangs up one lantern, and
Revere is able to do the right thing. If the lantern means that the British are coming
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by land, then it is true. Does its truth help explain Revere’s success? “Of course,” you
may be tempted to say, and indeed there is nothing immediately implausible about
this answer.
Yet consider again the Watt governor. The governor has no aspiration itself, but
it does have a human-given purpose: to maintain the inflow of steam at a fixed
level. Relative to this purpose the governor may succeed or fail. Suppose it succeeds.
A sudden surge of steam, and the balls swing higher, the throttle valve’s aperture
narrows, and all is good again in no time. And not just this once. For every degree
of deviation from the desired state there is a uniquely appropriate adjustment to the
valve that will negate it, and the governor succeeds in applying it every time. How
should the governor’s systematic success be explained?
I use my schema:
The governor’s success consists in maintaining steam inflow at I0 .
It has an internal state B (the vertical position of the balls) which, given
its structure, will cause behavior H (some adjustment to the throttle
valve).
H will produce I0 in the normal course of things.

The governor achieves success.
For every degree of deviation from the desired state, a unique B will be tokened and
cause a unique H. These B-states, I admit, look sort of like beliefs, and I would not
object to honoring them as “true”.
But imagine someone seriously giving truth an explanatory role:
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The governor’s success consists in maintaining I0 .
It believes—or believes*, whatever this should mean, now that the putative representational vehicle is the vertical position of two swinging
balls—of a certain behavior H (some adjustment to the throttle valve)
that it will produce I0 .
This belief* is true.

The governor achieves success.
It may be further alleged that this truth-laden schema captures a general pattern, in
its third line, which my schema has missed: “The governor does not just do different
things in different situations which somehow turn out to be successful. The governor
is systematically successful because it has true beliefs*!”
I may be speaking for you when I say that this truth-laden explanation is underwhelming. It feels underwhelming probably because the Watt governor does
not look like a representational system at all—because it lacks parts that look like
content-bearing vehicles to begin with. A similar truth-laden explanation seems quite
at home, however, in the lantern system, because that system is representational—
paradigmatically so. But this discrimination cannot be justified. Since the same explanatory model applies to both systems, it must assign truth to the same explanatory
role in both. Either truth plays a role in the Watt governor which I just do not see, or
its apparent role in the lantern system—and in the case of the beer-loving Brett—is
illusory.
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4.4 Conclusion
There is an old metaphor in philosophy of mind: hook up. (I think I first read it in
Blackburn 1984, when I was unaware that the phrase had a more risqué meaning.)
To represent the world is to be hooked up to the world. And hooking up, if you try
to visualize it, is something mechanical and dynamic. There is a rope of some sort,
thanks to which when the world moves you are dragged along.
This rope is the stabilizing force, which appears under the various guises of
evolution, learning, conscious design, and rational choice. It hooks up Revere and
the sexton to the British, dragging them to a good position wherever the British show
up. It also hooks up the Watt governor to steam flow, the voltage regulator to output
voltage, the blue jay to monarch butterflies, and minds in general to the world in
general.
My central thesis—or proposal—has been that there is no fundamental explanatory difference between all these hookings-up. They can all be explained by the same
sort of model, give or take some modifications. The implication of this can perhaps
be described as profound (almost a little too profound for my taste): if minds are
hooked up to the world in the same fundamental way as the Watt governor is to
steam flow, then there is no deep mystery about minds’ representing the world—no
more than there is deep mystery about how the Watt governor is hooked up to steam
flow—and any attempt to find a fundamental difference, to preserve an explanatorily
relevant distinction between the two, will be in vain. This is, of course, a very big if,
but not a baseless one. At least I have shown that Revere and the sexton and the blue
jay operate on the same principles as the governor and the regulator.
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Some hookings-up occur in cooperative enterprises, but most are probably heavily
exploited. Animals “play the world” to other animals. Here my proposal has been,
again, that we attend to the dynamics, to how an animal is dragged along or left
behind by the world, to how strong or frail the rope is. The sender–receiver model is
well suited to this task; folk intuition, not so much.
Skyrms begins Signals with a quote from Democritus: “The word is the shadow
of the deed.” So it is. Some deeds cast shadows, some don’t, but the difference lies
not in the deeds themselves.
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